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Scholars have long explored the lack of diversity in gifted-and-talented education and 
specifically the role that gifted-and-talented test performance plays as a barrier to access. 
However, there is limited work, particularly quantitative work, examining the ways in which 
policies perpetuate racial/ethnic and socioeconomic inequalities within the education system. 
I build upon the extant research by examining each stage of the admissions process, employing 
quantitative methods, and using a comprehensive sample of longitudinal admissions and 
enrollment data from New York City. This dissertation explores the diversity of gifted-and-
talented programs by addressing two research questions: 1) Do families who request testing, test, 
apply, and enroll their children in gifted-and-talented programs reflect diverse backgrounds? 
and 2) Do gifted-and-talented admissions criteria and priorities, specifically test score criteria 
and sibling priority, advantage certain students? 
My results suggest that from the onset, families engaging with the first step of the gifted-
and-talented admission process are not representative of the student population at large. While a 
more diverse group of families request testing and test, as families progress further along in 
navigating the admissions process, at each stage the families look more like one another. The 
filtering nature of the admissions process leaves far lower proportions of low-income, Black, and 





I also find that admissions rules advantage certain students to varying degrees. My 
findings reveal that test score cutoffs severely exacerbate the lack of diversity in gifted programs, 
giving the already advantaged families a further advantage. Contrastingly, I find that sibling 
priority does not exacerbate the lack of diversity to the same extent. Overall, the likelihood of 
receiving an offer does not vary by most sociodemographic characteristics. However, once a 
child meets the test score criteria, the score plays a far less important role in determining offers 
to a top choice program, and sibling preferences give families a strong advantage in receiving an 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Researchers, policymakers, educators, and communities have long grappled with the 
issue of equity in education. With the intent to address inequities, over the past few decades, 
national education policy has centered on improving the performance of the country’s lowest-
achieving students and reducing the achievement gap between subgroups of students. Only 
recently have policymakers and policy researchers begun to narrow in on issues related to the 
education of our highest-performing students, including the achievement gaps that exist among 
subgroups, referred to as “excellence gaps” (Plucker et al., 2010). Studies of advanced achievers 
have found that the excellence gaps among different gender groups, different racial groups, high- 
and low-socioeconomic status, and different levels of English language proficiency have 
widened in the era of NCLB (McMurrer & Kober, 2011; Plucker et al., 2010; Plucker et al., 
2013; Xiang et al., 2011). As the proportion of historically marginalized students of color and 
low-income students continues to rise in the county, the very existence of gaps raises doubts 
about the success of federal and state governments in providing greater and more equitable 
educational opportunities. Furthermore, the overall small percentage of students scoring at the 
highest level on achievement tests suggests potentially serious consequences for the long-term 
economic competitiveness of the U.S. in the international arena (Plucker et al., 2010).  
In gifted-and-talented education programs across the U.S., low-income students and 
historically marginalized students of color are substantially underrepresented (Ford, 1998; 
Donovan & Cross, 2002). In 2013, 13 percent of Asian and 8 percent of White K−12 students 





Hispanics1, 4 percent of Blacks, and 2 percent of English learners. Put another way, nearly 60 
percent of students in gifted-and-talented programs across the country are White, compared to 50 
percent of public school enrollment overall. In contrast, less than 30 percent of gifted-and-
talented students are Black or Hispanic, although they represent 40 percent of the overall student 
population (Office of Civil Rights, 2016). In New York City, the disparity is even more dramatic 
with Whites comprising about 40 percent of students in gifted programs, Asians comprising 
another 40 percent, and Black and Hispanic children making up less than 20 percent of the city’s 
gifted students.  
The lack of diversity in gifted-and-talented education, as well as in schools in general, 
poses a threat to the quality of education not only to the Black, Hispanic, and lower-income 
children who typically attend schools that are inferior, but also to their White, advantaged peers. 
While diversity comes in many forms including home language, immigration status, special 
needs, gender, etc., I primarily focus on diversity with respect to racial/ethnic background and 
socioeconomic status. A large body of work indicates that in general diverse, integrated schools 
have significant academic benefits for low-income students (Coleman, 1966; Kahlenberg, 2012; 
Orfield & Lee, 2005) and have benefits for all students in certain academic and social domains 
(The Century Foundation, 2019). Recent studies find that parents of all backgrounds tend to 
agree that racial and economic integration is important—at least in principle—and state that they 
would prefer that their children attend schools that are racially and economically integrated 
(Frankenberg & Jacobson, 2011; Torres & Weissbourg, 2020). Although parents claim to 
support integration, in districts where parents are actually given greater opportunities to choose 
schools for their children, schools appear to become more segregated. Research shows that many 
 






White, advantaged parents choose Whiter, more segregated schools (Orfield & Frankenberg, 
2013), and that White students are the least likely to attend schools with children from other 
racial/ethnic groups (Roda & Wells, 2013). Therefore, while some parents may value diversity 
and integration in theory, they either do not value it very much or other considerations take 
precedence over their commitment to integration. Furthermore, for parents who want to enroll 
their children in integrated schools, they do not always have the option to because there are not 
enough intentionally integrated schools to choose from (Roda, 2020b).  
Furthermore, some argue that gifted-and-talented programs allow for increased racial and 
socioeconomic segregation between gifted-and-talented and general education tracks (Borland, 
2003, 2009). Although White, advantaged parents express concern and discomfort with the 
segregating effects of gifted-and-talented education within urban elementary schools, some 
choose the gifted-and-talented program anyway and rationalize it as the “best” program for their 
child (Roda & Wells, 2013). As Roda (2015) explains, “Despite their critique about the fairness 
of the G&T policy, these parents still capitalize on their advantage in order to win one of the 
coveted G&T spots for their children in a high-status program, thus assuring the passage of 
‘advantage’ from one generation to the next. As parents explained, the biggest advantage of 
securing a G&T placement is that it seems to be a ‘feeder for the better middle schools, which 
then seems to be a feeder for the better high schools.’” (p. 2-3). Therefore, some contend that 
gifted-and-talented programs increase inequality by providing the already advantaged children 
and families with even greater advantages (Roda & Wells, 2013; Roda, 2015). 
In addition to the important role that family decisions play in determining the diversity of 
educational settings, the diversity of gifted-and-talented programs also hinges on the 





policy design and implementation can encourage racially and economically advantaged families 
to act in ways that exacerbate already prevalent racial and economic disparities in educational 
access and opportunity (Sattin-Bajaj & Roda, 2018). Therefore, to understand the extent to which 
policies shape the diversity of gifted-and-talented programs require exploration of the existing 
admissions rules. 
 
Purpose and Outline of Study 
Few studies have looked at how family choices and administrative rules shape gifted-and-
talented diversity (Mader et al., 2018; Sattin-Bajaj & Roda, 2018). More research is needed on 
the relationship between sociodemographic characteristics and the diversity in gifted-and-
talented admissions process. My work moves beyond much of the extant research in four 
important ways. First, to my knowledge, this is the first study that examines each stage of a 
gifted-and-talented admissions process, from start (requesting testing) to finish (enrollment). To 
begin with, families must express interest by requesting testing. Then, students must show up to 
take the test and are scored on the test. Among eligible students who score at or above the 90th 
percentile, families apply to gifted-and-talented programs of their choice. Then, a select group of 
students receive an offer to a program based on various admissions rules. Finally, families decide 
to either enroll their child in a gifted-and-talented program, a NYCDOE school, or leave the 
system for an alternative option. Exploring each of the stages of the gifted-and-talented 
admissions process provides a more comprehensive understanding of which stage issues of 
diversity percolate.  
Second, although many studies have examined gifted-and-talented test performance 





which policies perpetuate racial/ethnic and socioeconomic inequalities within the education 
system. To my knowledge, Sattin-Bajaj and Roda’s (2018) recent study analyzing the specific 
policies built into New York City’s elementary and high school choice plans that prompt middle-
class parents to secure advantages for their children is the first to examine how policies 
themselves encourage particular actions that may perpetuate inequality. While Sattin-Bajaj and 
Roda use the concept of “opportunity hoarding” as a lens through which to analyze school choice 
policies and their associations to advantaged parents’ exclusionary behaviors, my study applies 
the concept of bureaucratic decision rules as a lens to analyze formal admissions policies and 
their associations to the lack of diversity in the gifted-and-talented admissions process.  
Furthermore, unlike Sattin-Bajaj and Roda’s study, which was based on parent interview 
data, my work is based on quantitative analyses of both admissions and enrollment data. Sattin-
Bajaj and Roda’s qualitative study provides valuable data on understanding parents’ behaviors 
and experiences with the gifted-and-talented admissions process in one neighborhood elementary 
school. However, my quantitative study allows me to have a large sample size of 397,078 
observations total and to employ statistical analyses and derive important facts from the data, 
including preference trends, differences between groups, and demographics.  
Lastly, my research sample is also more comprehensive than samples used in most other 
studies. Most other analyses include the population children who enrolled in the traditional 
public school system (Card & Giuliano, 2016; Davis et al., 2010; Lu & Weinberg, 2016) and 
exclude those who might have enrolled in a private school, independent school, or charter school 
(as opposed to a traditional public school) instead. However, my sample includes families that 
engaged in the New York City public school system’s admission process at any stage, including 





(regardless of whether they tested or not), those who engaged in the kindergarten admissions 
process (regardless of whether they enrolled or not), as well as those who actually enrolled in 
any New York City public school for pre-kindergarten or kindergarten, including charter schools. 
Therefore, my study is generalizable to a broader population of families that engage in New 
York City, Department of Education (NYCDOE) admissions or enroll in NYCDOE schools and 
possibly offers auxiliary insights into how special services like gifted-and-talented programs 
might affect families’ decisions of whether or not to attend traditional public schools. 
In analyzing the diversity, or lack thereof, of gifted-and-talented programs, it is important 
to understand how families engage with each stage of the gifted-and-talented admissions process 
as well as how admissions criteria and priorities shape the diversity of programs. To better 
understand how the admissions process affects the diversity of gifted-and-talented programs, I 
address the following research questions: 
1. Do families who request testing, test, apply, and enroll their children in gifted-and-
talented programs reflect diverse backgrounds? Who requests testing, who takes the test, 
and who applies to gifted-and-talented programs? Of those who receive an offer, who 
actually enrolls in gifted-and-talented programs and who enrolls in NYCDOE schools? 
Do patterns vary by sociodemographic attributes? 
2. Do the gifted-and-talented admissions criteria and priorities advantage certain students? 
a. How do students perform on the gifted-and-talented test? To what extent do the 
test score criteria influence diversity of eligible students? 
b. How diverse are offers to gifted-and-talented programs? Do admissions priorities 
(specifically sibling priority) advantage certain students over others? Would 






I begin my work by reviewing the literature on gifted-and-talented admissions and 
building a conceptual framework for my analyses in Chapter 2. I refer to research related to 
gifted identification, factors impacting family referrals, and neighborhood effects on student 
outcomes for context on family engagement, as well as literature on early cognitive inequalities, 
shadow education, and legacy preferences in higher education to understand the role that 
admissions criteria and priorities can play in advantaging certain groups. My conceptual 
framework draws from three constructs—formal bureaucratic decision rules and formal rules, 
neo-institutionalism and informal rules, and electoral interests and systemic power—to 
understand how families navigate the gifted-and-talented admissions system, how the system is 
created and defined, and whose interests it serves. Accordingly, in Chapter 3, I then proceed to 
describe the data and methods I use to investigate my research questions. To respond to my first 
set of research questions, in Chapter 4 I employ two-level models, with students nested in 
elementary school zones to establish if family engagement with the admissions process varies for 
different sociodemographic groups. I then address my second set of research questions, exploring 
the role of admissions rules in Chapter 5. I use multi-level models and descriptive analyses to 
estimate the associations between sociodemographic characteristics and test scores and offers 
and between admissions policies and offers to top choice gifted-and-talented programs. I 
conclude by briefly summarizing my findings and by reflecting on the significance and 





Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
 Kindergarten gifted-and-talented admissions is a complicated multi-step process where 
families and communities engage with bureaucratic admissions policies. In New York City, 
gifted-and-talented admissions includes six separate stages: requesting testing, testing, test 
performance, applying, receiving an offer, and enrolling. While families must take initiative at 
several steps—requesting testing, testing, applying, and enrolling—these steps are intertwined 
with the bureaucratic rules determined by the NYCDOE. The primary admissions rules include 
criteria based on test score cutoffs and priorities to offers based on sibling status and community 
school district2 (CSD) of residence. Therefore, it is important to understand how the diversity of 
gifted-and-talented enrollment is shaped by both family and community context and admissions 
policies. 
In the review that follows, I use my framework to summarize literature relevant to the 
gifted-and-talented admissions process. I begin with a discussion of the referral process and the 
role that family and community contexts play, as this allows me to understand how families 
engage with school systems and how this would influence the diversity of gifted-and-talented 
programs. I then narrow in New York City’s gifted-and-talented admissions policies, including 
test score criteria and sibling preferences, as these are two critical points where formal policies 
filter candidates in the city’s gifted-and-talented admissions process, and draw from literature on 
early cognitive inequalities, shadow education, and legacy policies in higher education. Finally, I 
turn my attention to reviewing the literature on three constructs—bureaucratic decisions rules, 
neo-institutional theory, and electoral interests and systemic power—to understand how families 
 
2 New York City’s elementary schools are grouped into 32 community school districts across the five boroughs of 





navigate the admissions system, how the system is created and defined, and whose interests they 
serve. 
 
Engagement in Gifted-and-Talented Programs 
Identification: Referral Versus Universal Screening 
Embedded in the issue of the lack of diversity in gifted-and-talented programs are 
concerns about the very first step, the process by which students are identified for consideration 
for placement in gifted-and-talented programs (Pfeiffer, 2003; Siegle & Powell, 2004). Universal 
screening programs use an identification practice where all students in a targeted grade are 
administered an initial assessment. Scoring at or above a pre-determined cut-score on the test 
leads to further consideration for placement and/or services in a gifted-and-talented program, 
usually involving at least one additional assessment to determine eligibility and instructional 
needs. The alternative to universal screening is often a referral process where parents and/or 
teachers recommend students for testing for gifted-and-talented services (Lankin, 2016; McBee, 
2006). The end result of either of these processes can be identification or placement for gifted-
and-talented services. 
Most school districts’ gifted-and-talented programs require a student be referred before 
any formal testing process begins. According to a national survey, 87 percent of districts use 
teacher nominations and 81 percent use parent nominations as some part of their identification 
system (Callahan et al., 2013). Importantly, once a student has been nominated or referred, most 
districts, as is the case in New York City, are obligated to use a formal assessment process to 





However, more recently, in an effort to allow all students to have an equal (or closer to 
equal) chance of being identified and offered special services, several school districts have 
introduced universal screening for gifted-and-talented programs. A study of a large and diverse 
school district in Florida that started screening all of its second graders for its gifted-and-talented 
program found that that universal screening increased identification of disadvantaged 
students. While the district was overwhelmingly low-income, Black, and Hispanic, its gifted-
and-talented program was filled with high-income, White students when it relied on parent and 
teacher referrals in the admissions process. However, introducing a universal screening program 
led to a 174 percent increase in the probability of being identified as gifted among disadvantaged 
children (Card & Giuliano, 2016). Evidence suggests that if taking these entrance exams is 
voluntary, many talented, disadvantaged students will go undetected.  
In considering the impact of universal testing on gifted-and-talented outcomes, studies on 
the effects of mandatory college entrance exams on postsecondary outcomes provide a useful 
context. The ACT or SAT exams are required for admission to virtually all selective colleges in 
the U.S. Students must register and pay for these tests and then travel to a testing center on a 
weekend to take them. While this process seems straightforward if you have the appropriate 
resources, including internet access, a computer, a credit card, and transportation, students 
missing any of these resources face obstacles to simply taking the exam. Currently, in over 25 
states, the ACT or SAT is now a requirement, given in school, for free, on a school day during 
school hours.  
Beginning in 2007, all public, high school students in Michigan were required to take the 
ACT exam. Hyman (2017) analyzed how this shift in policy impacted test taking rates, test 





school students taking a college entrance exam rose from half to nearly all (91 percent). The 
growth was even sharper among low-income students, of whom only 35 percent were previously 
taking the test but over 85 percent were taking the test after it became mandatory. Hyman also 
found that thousands of academically talented students in Michigan had not been taking the ACT 
or the SAT. For every 100 students who took the test and scored high enough to attend a 
selective college before testing was universal, another 23 high scoring students were revealed by 
the new policy. Among low-income students, the effect was even more dramatic: for every 100 
low-income students who scored college-ready, another 48 college-ready, low-income students 
were uncovered by the universal test. While Hyman’s small sample size may overstate the 
proportional difference between all eligible students and low-income students, similar stories of 
how universal testing broadened the pool of candidates are echoed in other states and school 
districts that have made the ACT or SAT mandatory. Studies evaluating the college enrollment 
effects of mandatory ACT or SAT policies in Maine (Hurwitz et al., 2015; Klasik, 2013), Illinois 
(Goodman, 2016; Klasik, 2013), and Colorado (Goodman, 2016; Klasik, 2013) have similarly 
found that a universal test uncovers many academically able students that would have otherwise 
gone unrecognized.  
Despite the evidence suggesting likely benefits of universal screening for gifted-and-
talented programs, there are trade-offs in deciding to use referral versus universal screening as 
the first step in gifted-and-talented identification. Some argue that the advantage of the referral 
process is that it is efficient and cost-effective because it requires parents or teachers to take the 
initiative to nominate a student for screening. It lessens the burden on the district because fewer 
students need to be screened and likely fewer students will require gifted-and-talented services. 





Brooklyn Borough President, Eric Adams, found that it would only cost roughly $1 million to 
conduct universal gifted-and-talented testing for all 70,000 students in New York City’s pre-
kindergarten classes, which is “a mere drop in the city schools’ gargantuan $32 billion annual 
budget” (Chapman, 2019). In response to the finding, Adams asserted, “An opt-out model for 
testing the gifted and talented abilities of our youngest students would ensure we identify 
exceptional potential as early as possible, expand the number of Gifted & Talented seats, and 
strengthen the pipeline to specialized and other high-performing high schools” (Chapman, 2019). 
According to the IBO, if testing were expanded to include kindergarten, first, and second grade 
as well, the annual budget would increase to about $3.8 million each year. While additional costs 
would incur to also expand the number of gifted-and-talented seats, this new information 
suggests that money would go a long way in reversing the infamous inequalities that persist in 
the city’s school system where children from poor neighborhoods are routinely shut out of 
gifted-and-talented programs.  
While being mindful of the tradeoffs to universal screening, mounting evidence of the 
underrepresentation of qualified historically marginalized students of color, low socioeconomic 
status students, and English learner students in receiving gifted-and-talented services suggest that 
absent universal testing, teacher- and/or parent-discretion in the referral process is a barrier to 
access (Card & Giuliano, 2016, Elhoweris, 2008; Elhoweris et al., 2005; Ford et al., 2008; 
Grissom & Redding, 2016; Woods & Achey, 1990). Nominations are thought to be biased when 
teachers do not recognize talents equally among all students and may overlook gifted students 
who do not fit traditional archetypes of giftedness (Frasier et al., 1995; Siegle & Powell, 2004). 





and awareness of school services are not distributed equally among racial/ethnic and 
socioeconomic groups (e.g., Oakland, 1972; Reese et al., 1995). 
Family Background 
Absent universal screening, parents play an important role in a child’s educational 
trajectory and specifically, a child’s opportunity to participate in special programming like 
gifted-and-talent programs. Parents are increasingly encouraged to become not only consumers 
within education but also “active partners’ in the production of educated children (McNamara et 
al., 2000). Previously dominant theories of the role of the education system in cultural 
inheritance and social reproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979) gave way and more directly 
linked student outcomes to parental human capital. High stakes, standards driven schooling 
shifted the rules of the game pushing more and more “schoolwork” into the home. There was an 
increasing reliance on and expectation of parents to proactively pursue and be involved in their 
children’s education. However, in addition to financial resources, key aspects of cultural capital, 
such as educational knowledge and information about schooling and confidence and trust in 
relation to teachers, schools, and the educational system, all have a bearing on the extent to 
which parents feel empowered to intervene in their child’s educational trajectory.  
Lareau’s (2003) seminal work suggests that parenting styles differ by class. Middle-class 
parents adopt an approach Lareau refers to as “concerted cultivation,” a childrearing practice 
where parents participate in the organization of their child’s afterschool activities and provide a 
structured life for their child. These advantaged parents generally have a better education and try 
to teach their children things that are not taught in school that will help them to perform 
better. However, working-class and poor families adopt a childrearing type she refers to as 





emphasize values upon their children that will give them an advantage in school and are less 
involved with the structure of their child’s after school activities, often involving their children in 
less organized activities and with more free time. These different parenting styles translate to 
middle-class parents believing that they have the right and the responsibility to intervene on 
behalf of their children, leading their children not only to have more personalized and more 
tailored interactions with their teachers but also to expect this individualization and later 
intervene on their own behalf. Contrastingly, parents of working-class and poor students may not 
speak up as vocally, either because they are unaware of the existence of such a program, may 
feel uncomfortable talking with school staff, or in some cases may even feel they are in danger of 
being deported; “These parents won’t speak up, won’t draw attention to themselves, in part 
because of their respect of school authorities … And some families are undocumented” (D’Orio, 
2017, p.6). To better understand family engagement in gifted-and-talented admissions, I explore 
the literature on administrative and informational barriers, parents’ trust of teachers and schools, 
and parents’ educational involvement. 
Parents’ Access to Information. One factor shaping family participation in the gifted-and-
talented admissions process is parents’ access to information. While parents of low 
socioeconomic status, historically marginalized students of color, or non-English speaking 
students desire academic success for their children and want to learn how to help their children 
achieve in school, their knowledge of the educational system is often limited (Callahan et al., 
1995) as is their access to appropriate resources. In New York City, gifted-and-talented 
education programs are one pathway for entering kindergartners among many others including 
traditional neighborhood (zoned) public schools, non-zoned public schools, magnet schools, and 





process. However, as with enrolling in a charter school, enrolling in a gifted-and-talented 
program is a multi-step process, in which parents first “choose to choose.” The parents who 
choose to choose are self-selecting into the gifted-and-talented admission process and may not be 
representative of the entire population of parents.  
One of the central components in the equity of access to educational opportunities 
involves the availability and dissemination of information on programmatic offerings and the 
availability and extensiveness of transportation (Belfield & Levin, 2009; Levin, 2002, 2009). 
Families that are better-off may be more likely to take advantage of school choice than those 
who are worse off because they have better access to information, greater ability to afford 
transportation, a higher predilection to exercise educational alternatives, and greater overall 
experience with navigating choice and alternatives. Evidence consistently supports that families 
that exercise school choice options are more advantaged both educationally and economically 
than those who continue to attend their assigned neighborhood public schools (Levin, 1998, 
2002). A higher education level of parents is positively associated with a greater tendency for 
them to advocate for their children’s placement in advanced courses and actively manage their 
children’s education (Baker & Stevenson, 1986; Lareau, 2003). In contrast, parents from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds face many more barriers to involvement, including a lack of 
resources and information.  
The disparity of sources of information is also a product of inequality in parental 
networks. In their interviews with advantaged, White parents, Sattin-Bajaj and Roda (2018) 
found that many relied on “mom gossip networks” to make important decisions about which 
schools and programs to pursue, which ones avoid, and what strategies to use to gain access to 





personal relationships to gather information and insider tips (Lareau, 2003; Sattin-Bajaj & Roda, 
2018) have an informational advantage in the availability of educational opportunities and 
strategies to gain access to these opportunities. Thus, many academics and researchers have 
raised concerns that the students left behind in their designated schools lose their most 
advantaged and academically equipped peers and public schools lose the parents who would be 
more active and involved in bettering the schools (Lacireno-Pacquet et al., 2002; Levin, 1998, 
2002; Teske & Schneider, 2001). 
Although higher education differs vastly from gifted-and-talented services, recent 
literature on targeted interventions aimed at increasing access to administrative assistance and 
information regarding college enrollment have found large, positive effects (Bettinger et al., 
2012; Carrell & Sacerdote, 20017; Castleman & Page, 2014; Hoxby & Turner, 2013). For 
example, Bettinger et al. (2012) found that having HR Block auto-complete the FAFSA form for 
families with high school seniors resulted in an 8-percentage point increase in college-
enrollment. Carrell and Sacerdote (2017) also found that sustained mentoring and help from a 
parent, counselor, and/or teacher in navigating through each piece of the application process 
increased college enrollment, especially among women. Castleman and Page’s (2014) study of 
the effects of targeted messages on summer melt found that they ameliorated effects of summer 
melt and increased the proportion of college bound seniors who enroll in college the following 
fall. Furthermore, Hoxby and Turner’s (2013) study of tailored information outreach found that 
high achieving low-income students applied to and attended more selective schools when mailed 
information specifically tailored to that student.  
Specific to gifted-and-talented admissions, one study recently addressed the consequence 





higher income peers in New York City (ideas42, n.d.). The researchers redesigned emails and 
postcards to encourage preschool parents to sign their students up for the test. They found an 
increase in test registration by 6.5 percent in a randomized controlled trial with over 60,000 
preschool parents. Although the college admissions and gifted-and-talented admissions processes 
are different in many respects, these studies of interventions aiming to reduce administrative and 
informational barriers in the college admissions process, as well as the study on New York City’s 
gifted-and-talented admissions process, suggest that reducing such barriers in admissions could 
similarly increase the proportion of low-income, historically marginalized students of color 
engaging in the gifted-and-talented admissions process and enrolling in gifted-and-talented 
programs.  
Parents’ Trust of Teachers and Schools. Another aspect of the family-school relationship 
that may encourage or discourage participation in gifted-and-talented admissions is parent trust 
of teachers and schools (Adams & Christenson, 2000; Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Dunlap & Fox, 
2007). Parent trust is particularly important to understand in elementary school when new parent-
teacher and parent-school relationships are established (Rimm-Kaufman & Pianta, 2005). Bryk 
and Schneider (2002) assert that relational trust—teachers with students, teachers with other 
teachers, teachers with parents, and all groups with the school principal—is based on each party 
in the relationship maintaining an understanding of his or her role’s obligations, holding some 
expectations about the obligations of the other parties, and constantly discerning the intentions 
embedded in the actions of others. In other words, trust in family-school partnerships is defined 
by “confidence that another person will act in a way to benefit or sustain the relationship, or the 
implicit or explicit goals of the relationship, to achieve positive outcomes for students” (Adams 





Several studies have explored the specific relationship of trust between parents and 
teachers or schools. Nzinga-Johnson et al. (2009) found that among parents and teachers, higher 
parent involvement was associated with better quality parent-teacher relationships as measured 
by attributes such as communication, trust, and warmth. A study conducted in Turkey of parents 
of secondary school children (Beycioglu et al., 2013) found that parent trust of schools was 
positively related to parent involvement. Similarly, Adams and Christenson’s (1998) study of 
middle school parents found that parents who reported high levels of trust also participated in 
more parent involvement activities than did parents with low or moderate levels of trust. 
Although in a follow-up study, Adams and Christenson (2000) found diminishing levels of 
parent trust across elementary, middle, and high school. Another study conducted in Turkey with 
an early childhood teacher sample found that teachers’ trust in parents was positively associated 
with parent involvement (Karakus & Savas, 2012). Santiago et al.’s (2016) study of parents of 
kindergarten through fourth-grader children in the Pacific Northwest region of the U.S. 
reciprocally found that higher levels of parents’ trust in teachers were associated with increased 
parent educational involvement. However, it is important to note the bidirectional causality with 
all of these studies; parents’ trust of teachers and schools may increase parent involvement or 
parent involvement may increase parents’ trust. 
Evidence regarding the influence demographic attributes have on parent trust of schools 
or teachers are mixed. Several studies have found no statistically significant association between 
family demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, free or reduced-price lunch 
eligibility, parent education) and parent trust (Adams & Christenson, 1998, 2000; Lerkkanen et 
al., 2013). Contrastingly, other studies of Estonia and Finland (Kikas at al., 2011) and Norway 





demographic characteristics (e.g., child gender, parent education) and parent trust. A recent study 
by Santiago at al. (2016) of parents of kindergarten through fourth-grader children in the Pacific 
Northwest region of the U.S. investigated how eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch and 
other family characteristics relate to parent-teacher relationships. They found that students who 
were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, who had an alternate caregiver, and whose primary 
home language was non-English were significant predictors of a decrease in parent trust in their 
child’s teacher and their child’s school. In contrast to the international studies (Kikas et al., 2011; 
Westergard & Galloway, 2004), Santiago et al.’s study did not find an association between 
parent education level and parent trust. 
Parents’ Educational Involvement. Furthermore, parents’ educational involvement may 
also influence participation in gifted-and-talented services. Mounting evidence suggests that 
parental educational involvement is an important ingredient for student success, as measured by 
regular school attendance, higher academic performance, higher standardized test scores, 
improved behavior, and higher homework completion (Alameda-Lawson, 2014; Anderson & 
Minke, 2007; Dearing et al., 2006; Fishel & Ramirez, 2005; Guli, 2005; Hoover-Dempsey et al., 
2005). Two primary approaches for understanding parental involvement are represented in the 
research literature: first, the relationship between sociodemographic characteristics and 
likelihood of parents being involved with schooling; and second, the relationship between 
parental perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes about schools and their involvement.  
Of concern is the extant research on the relationship between parental involvement and 
sociodemographic characteristics that finds that historically marginalized people of color and 
low-income parents experience less positive relationships with teachers and engage in fewer 





contrast to the mixed results of parent trust literature, overall, evidence from the broader parent 
education involvement literature suggest that family demographic attributes, particularly parent 
education and socioeconomic status, are statistically associated with parent involvement, where 
parents of higher levels of education and income are more likely to be involved in schooling than 
parents of lower socioeconomic backgrounds (Dauber & Epstein, 1993; Fantuzzo et al., 2000; 
Grolnick et al., 1997; Grolnick & Slowiaczek, 1994; Manz et al., 2004). While some researchers 
also find a significant relationship between marital status and parent involvement where married 
parents are more involved than single parents or widowed, separated, or divorced parents 
(Fantuzzo et al., 2000; Grolnick et al., 1997; Grolnick & Slowiaczek, 1994), other research does 
not find a relationship between the two (Dauber & Epstein, 1993). 
Research exploring the relationship between parental involvement and parental 
perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes about schools point to the importance of parents’ own 
educational experiences. Manz et al. (2004) examined a group of low-income first- through fifth-
graders and also found that caregivers with a high school education were associated with higher 
levels of involvement. The association between parent education and home-school 
communications is consistent with theories that caregivers’ personal success in school (as 
indicated by high school completion) may predispose them to feel comfortable, competent, and 
confident to interface with school professionals and that parents with limited educational 
experiences may be less familiar with the educational terminology and concepts that teachers and 
schools use to discuss student academic progress (Dauber & Epstein, 1993; Fantuzzo et al., 
2000). 
Furthermore, studies have found that parents’ own experiences as students and their 





involvement (Eccles & Harold, 1996). Taylor et al. (2004) apply an ecological systems 
conceptual framework to understand the academic socialization of children within the family 
context. They suggest that as a parent prepares a child to start school, the parent’s memories of 
his or her own school experiences are likely to become reactivated and may influence how the 
parent interprets and directs the child’s school experiences. Memories of supportive school 
experiences are likely to enhance parents’ involvement and comfort interacting with their 
children’s school. 
However, other evidence challenge generalizations that less educated and low-income 
parents cannot or do not want to be involved in their children’s education, and instead suggest 
that when teachers help them, parents of all backgrounds can be productively involved in their 
children’s education (Epstein, 1986). Part of the variation in parental involvement among 
families is due to the fact that schools vary in how much and how well they involve families. In a 
large-scale study of elementary teachers, parents, and students found that teachers who actively 
and frequently sought out parent involvement did not prejudge less educated, poor, or single 
parents. They rated all groups of parents higher on helpfulness and follow-through on learning 
activities with their children (Becker & Epstein, 1982; Epstein, 1986). This evidence underscores 
the importance of developing more responsive programs and practices to increase parent 
involvement. 
Despite efforts to encourage families to participate in the gifted-and-talented admissions 
process, the diversity of programs may be constrained by family preferences for educational 
settings where they are racially or socioeconomically represented rather than isolated. In a study 
questioning the complementary relationship between choice and integration, Henig (1990) 





schools in Montgomery County, Maryland, and school characteristics. Despite the goal of using 
magnet schools to encourage integration, Henig found that White families were most likely to 
request transfer to schools with low proportions of historically marginalized students of color, 
which were also located in higher-income neighborhoods and that students of color were more 
likely to choose of schools with higher proportions of students of color located in neighborhoods 
with lower income and more poverty.  
Regardless of families’ decisions to enroll their children in opportunities like gifted-and-
talented programs, in general, disparities in families’ access to information, their trust in schools 
and teachers, and their educational involvement influence the diversity of families who express 
interest in the gifted-and-talent admissions process. Although parents and parental figures are 
important representatives for their child and must take initiative to participate, communities also 
play an important role in shaping the diversity of gifted-and-talented programming. 
Community and Neighborhood Effects 
While mounting evidence confirms that the family background is undoubtedly linked to a 
child’s educational opportunities and outcomes, there are also strong reasons to believe that 
neighborhoods are important as well. Sampson (2012) argues that communities matter because 
life is decisively shaped by where you live and “neighborhoods are not merely settings in which 
individual act out the dramas produced by autonomous and preset scripts, or empty vessels 
determined by ‘bigger’ external forces, but are important determinants of the quantity and quality 
of human behavior in their own right” (p. 22). 
It is important to consider the potential differential effects that neighborhoods have on 
children at each stage of development. The general presumption is that parental influence is 





schools, have a greater effect on children as they grow older and are involved in schools and 
community activities (Kim et al., 1999). While young children’s interactions with neighborhood 
conditions may be limited given their limited and supervised contact, adolescents have much 
more direct contact with neighborhood peers, adults, and institutions, thereby facilitating 
stronger neighborhood effect. Studies have shown that neighborhood effects increase as youth 
become increasingly autonomous from their families and increase their contact with 
neighborhood actors over time (Brooks-Gunn et al., 1997; Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Although 
these estimated neighborhood effects were much smaller than that of various family 
characteristics, some evidence suggests that the presence of affluent families in a child’s 
neighborhood was a significant predictor of cognitive development during early childhood year 
and even more so during late adolescence (Brooks-Gunn et al., 1997).  
However, it is also plausible that neighborhoods exert indirect effects on young children 
through the experiences of their parents in the neighborhood (Kim et al., 1999; Klebanov et al., 
1994), where the associations between neighborhoods and young children’s development are 
transmitted by family processes, such as parenting behaviors and home environment. For 
example, research shows that the level of community resources available to parents is 
significantly and positively related to the quality of the home environment for children 
(Voydanoff & Donnelly, 1998), an important factor in the overall well-being of children. These 
community resources are typically more available in advantaged neighborhoods. Parents in 
middle-class neighborhoods tend to have better access to everything from children’s health care 
and nutritional needs to library reading programs and informal playground networks. Parents in 





suffer from the physical and emotional stresses that result from high crime rates and 
neighborhood tensions.  
Contrary to evidence that older children may be more susceptible to neighborhood 
effects, some researchers find stronger neighborhood effects for younger children. For example, 
Vartanian and Houser (2012) found that the effects of childhood Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) usage are sensitive to both residential neighborhood and age at 
receipt. Receiving SNAP during primary school years, and not at older ages, increases predicted 
adult BMI for children growing up in advantaged neighborhoods. Sharkey et al. (2014) also 
found that community violence in New York City reduced the standardized test performance of 
elementary school students, while having no impact on middle school students. A substantial 
body of work has also explored neighborhood socioeconomic conditions on student achievement, 
which I discuss in the following section with respect to the inequalities of early child cognitive 
development. In general, the neighborhood effects literature has found that growing up in a 
disadvantaged neighborhood can negatively, albeit modestly, affect individuals’ outcomes, 
adjusting for family background (Sampson et al., 2002; Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn. 2000; 
Sampson, 2012).  
 
Admissions Policies and Diversity in the Distribution of Services 
Admissions Criteria: Test Score Cutoffs 
In addition to the role that family and community contexts play in shaping the diversity 
of gifted-and-talented programs, admissions policies play an equally important role. A primary 
admissions criterion in gifted-and-talented admissions is the test score cutoff. In many districts, 





gifted-and-talented programs. In New York City, despite the intent to increase the diversity of 
gifted-and-talented admissions through a transparent, centralized admissions process and by 
making testing free, basing eligibility on a unified cutoff score of the 90th percentile for district 
programs and the 97th percentile for city programs might have the opposite effect. Studies of 
early cognitive inequalities and shadow education indicate potential consequences for the 
diversity of the program. 
Early Cognitive Inequalities. Multiple studies have documented substantial and persistent 
differences in achievement based on student background and neighborhood conditions. These 
works found that gaps originate early in life, persist over time, are measurable throughout a 
person’s lifetime and are also strongly mediated by income and other factors related to income 
(Lee & Burkam, 2002; Ready, 2010). Lee and Burkam (2002) found that cognitive gaps between 
children of different socioeconomic backgrounds and races/ethnicities were both sizeable and 
statistically significant at school entry in kindergarten. In their study, cognitive achievement of 
children in the highest socioeconomic group was 60 percent higher than that of children in the 
lowest socioeconomic group, but cognitive skills were much less closely related to race/ethnicity 
after accounting for socioeconomic status. Research also suggests that the persistence of poverty 
appears to affect early child cognitive outcomes. Duncan et al. (1994) found that accounting for 
all other family demographic conditions, being poor in all of the first four years of life is 
associated with about a 9-point difference in Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of 
Intelligence IQ test scores at age 5, compared with not being poor in those years. In contrast, 
being poor for some but not all those years was associated with about a 4-point differences, 
compared to not being poor. Furthermore, the magnitude of poverty also contributes to child 





below the poverty threshold have test scores that are substantially lower than their peers residing 
in households with incomes above the threshold. Children who were extremely poor—those in 
families with income below 50% of the poverty threshold—were the lowest scorers, while 
children in families with incomes closer to but still below the poverty line all scored lower that 
higher income peers, but the differences were smaller (Smith et al., 1997). Similarly, a study of 
completed schooling found that the effects of income were much greater for children with family 
incomes below $20,000 than for those with incomes above $20,000 (Duncan et al., 1998). 
Duncan et al. (1998) also found that income appears to matter the most in early childhood than in 
other stages of life. For example, controlling for income later in childhood as well as for 
demographic characteristics of households, they found that a $10,000 increase in income 
averaged over the first five years of life for children in low-income families is associated with a 
nearly three times increase in the odds of finishing high school. This estimated effect was much 
larger than the corresponding estimated effects of increases in income measured later in 
childhood. 
In addition to family characteristics, neighborhood conditions, specifically neighborhood 
income, also affect child development. The possibility that neighborhood poverty affects child 
cognitive skills independent of family poverty is particularly relevant in large urban areas, where 
concentrated neighborhood poverty is most severe. Poor parents are constrained in their choice 
of neighborhoods and schools. Low income may lead to residence in extremely poor 
neighborhoods characterized by social disorganization (e.g., crime, many unemployed adults, 
neighbors who do not monitor the behavior of adolescents), and few resources for child 





Several studies have analyzed the association between neighborhood income and student 
outcomes. Kohen et al. (2002) and Turley (2003) examined the effects of neighborhood 
characteristics on test scores for preschoolers using the Canadian National Longitudinal Survey 
of Children and Youth and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics Child Development 
Supplement, respectively. Kohen et al. (2002) found that both neighborhood affluence and 
poverty were significantly related to verbal ability even when taking into account family 
socioeconomic status. Turley (2003) found that higher neighborhood income was associated with 
better test scores but only for White students. For Blacks, the effect occurred only when a high 
proportion of Blacks lived in the neighborhood. Furthermore, the effects of neighborhood 
disadvantage were stronger for children who had lived in their neighborhood longer. Using data 
from a representative sample of Black children observed longitudinally, Sampson, Sharkey, and 
Raudenbush (2008) showed that living in poor neighborhoods decreases children’s subsequent 
verbal ability by the equivalent of one year of school. The effects of neighborhood poverty 
persisted for many years even after children move out of poor neighborhoods. Therefore, while 
test scores seem like an unbiased measure, basing gifted-and-talented eligibility on test scores 
alone prevents the participation of many socioeconomically disadvantaged children.  
Shadow Education. Further exacerbating early cognitive inequalities, a body of research 
suggests that test preparation such as shadow education can undermine efforts to rate students 
meritocratically and give an unfair advantage to children from families with the resources and 
means to provide such preparation. In every district, there are parents who aggressively push for 
their child to be included in a gifted-and-talented program—even paying for private screenings 
or test preparation, which give them an unfair advantage on the test. The debate over testing for 





“fairness” of the SAT and the extent to which it should be used in the college admission process 
(Thernstrom & Glazer, 1999). The main issue is that over-reliance on SAT scores in college 
admissions has implications for issues of merit and diversity in education (Alon & Tienda, 
2007). It is likely that access to and use of test preparation vary by the family background of 
students (Briggs, 2001; Powers & Rock, 1998). Although much of the extant research has 
focused on the relevance of “shadow education” with respect to the SAT rather than gifted-and-
talented testing, the literature provides context for understanding the role of test preparation for 
gifted-and-talented programs.  
Shadow education refers to educational activities, such as tutoring and extra classes, 
occurring outside of the formal educational system that are “designed to improve a student’s 
chance of successfully moving through the allocation process” (Stevenson & Baker, 1992, p. 
1640) and for the purposes of “mastering curriculum, examinations, and earning grades for 
learning and skills used by schools to grant students further educational opportunities” (Baker & 
LeTendre, 2005, p. 56). The prevalence of shadow education and its goals vary across nations, 
but its global spread is so striking that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO, 2006) expressed concern that the rapid expansion of privatized shadow 
education could negatively influence formal educational systems in terms of both equity and 
quality. As families increasingly use out-of-school strategies to foster their children’s success in 
school (Baker & LeTendre, 2005; Buchmann et al., 2010), institutionalized shadow education 
(i.e., private tutoring and learning centers) will magnify inequality and confound a nation’s 
ability to provide equitable and high-quality education to the general population. 
High-socioeconomic parents have more opportunities to influence the trajectories of their 





advantages translate into school-level inequalities in classroom resources and teacher experience. 
Another explanation is that family-based, non-school inequalities—both concrete and less 
tangible educational investments parents make for their children—also play a vital role in 
educational outcomes (Downey et al., 2004; Lareau 2002; Teachman, 1987). A key mechanism 
for non-school inequalities is the cultural and social capital that families pass to their children. 
Cultural capital is most often conceptualized and measured either as high-status cultural 
knowledge and preferences (Bourdieu, 1977; DiMaggio, 1982) or as a broader skill set including 
cognitive, linguistic, and social or behavioral skills (Condron, 2007). Social capital reflects 
positive and rewarding relationships between children, their parents, the community, and schools 
and teachers (Coleman, 1988). Social and cultural capital are often garnered outside of school, 
where parents structure children’s out-of-school activities in educationally meaningful ways 
(Lareau, 2002, 2003). Such capital may be beneficial directly, by helping to secure access to 
quality higher education (Sandefur et al., 2006), or indirectly, by influencing teacher 
expectations and perceptions and children’s curricular placement and educational progress 
(Condron, 2007). 
Buchmann (2002) argued that the use of shadow education constitutes a form of cultural 
capital. She found that Kenyan children from wealthy families were far more likely than other 
children to participate in shadow education activities such as tutoring and test preparation 
courses outside of school. Furthermore, recent research by Buchmann et al. (2010) used the 
National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS) to address how participating in various forms of 
SAT test preparation mediates educational inequality associated with family socioeconomic 
background in the U.S. They found that family background inequalities, particularly in income, 





education activities have important implications for test performance and enrollment in selective 
colleges. 
The growing debate over the value and fairness of SAT scores in the college admissions 
process raises concern for the unequal preparation for tests that students have for the gifted-and-
talented test. As the studies discussed note, various forms of shadow education exacerbate 
inequalities in admissions processes and the educational system more broadly speaking by giving 
already advantaged families an advantage in standardized testing, and thus in admissions. 
Although high SAT scores by no means guarantee admission to selective universities, low scores 
very often disqualify students from admission. This is similarly concerning for gifted-and-
talented programming in New York City, where test score cutoffs are used as an admissions 
criterion, limiting who is even eligible to apply for programs.  
Admissions Priorities: Legacies 
In addition to the test score criterion, in New York City, gifted-and-talented admissions 
also holds a few admissions priority rules that give certain students an advantage to entry. 
Among all eligible candidates, first priority to admissions is given to applicants whose sibling 
currently attends the school, with the rationale that it would be logistically helpful for families to 
have their children attend the same school. Somewhat similar to sibling priorities, in higher 
education, legacy preferences give admissions preferences to university applicants whose parents 
or grandparents attended a particular institution. As with legacy preferences that not only go 
against the ideals of merit and equity but also disproportionately benefit White applicants whose 
parents are more likely to have attended American universities (Howell & Turner, 2004), sibling 
preferences also advantage a “legacy” over merit and disproportionately benefit White, Asian, 





better understand the implications that sibling priorities have on the diversity of gifted-and-
talented programs, I explore the historical context of legacy policies and the impact that they 
have on the racial composition of higher education institutions.  
Legacy Policies: Historical Context. The first legacy preferences in the U.S. were put in 
place in the 1920s, during an era of increasing selectivity at the university level and increasing 
nativism at the national level. Even the most prestigious universities that had previously admitted 
all students that possessed the requisite academic qualifications increased selectivity because 
they faced dramatically increasing enrollments as veterans returned from World War I. In part 
due to the social and political effects of World War I, this decision coincided with an increased 
anti-immigrant sentiment often directed at Jews, and this anti- Jewish sentiment was widespread 
on university campuses. Addressing the dual “problems” of general over-enrollment and high 
levels of Jewish enrollment, many both public and private universities across the nation followed 
Yale’s lead, which first introduced legacy admissions preference in 1925 (Howell & Turner, 
2004; Ladewski, 2010).  
 Since that time, legacy policies have become widespread at public and private 
universities across the U.S. In addition to historical changes with universities admitting women 
beginning the in 1960s and historically marginalized students of color in response to the Civil 
Rights movement (Howell & Turner, 2004), more recently, the echo of the baby-boom, the 
decreasing importance of distance between the applicant and college (Hoxby, 2009), the 
increasing numbers of applications submitted per applicant (Spivack, 2009), the expanding 
international applicant pools, and increases in financial aid (Heller, 2006) have increased the 





education has challenged the traditional advantages of legacy applicants while also making 
legacy preferences more valuable to their potential recipients.  
 Comparing admissions trends for legacies to non-legacies, the observed differences in 
acceptance rates are significant. In 2019, about 48 percent of colleges and universities considered 
legacy preferences in their freshmen-admissions decisions, down from 58 percent in 2004 
(Belkin, 2020). With respect to the enrolled student body, as of 2003, legacies comprised 10 to 
15 percent of the students at Ivy League schools and up to 23 percent of the students at other 
major institutions (Golden, 2003). In terms of admissions rates, Bowen and Bok’s (1998) study 
of 28 selective institutions of higher education measuring the competitive advantage of legacies 
who began college in the fall of 1989 found that “the overall admission rate for legacies was 
almost twice that for all other candidates” (p. 28). In a more recent study of the impact of legacy 
status on admissions at 30 highly selective colleges and universities, legacies were more than 
three times as likely to gain admissions as non-legacies (Hurwitz, 2011). Specifically, in Yale’s 
entering classes of 1986-1995, 19 percent of all applicants were admitted, versus 43 percent of 
children of alumni (Lamb, 1993). More recently, admissions at Harvard University reveal that 
legacy applicants were more than five times more likely to be admitted, with legacy applicants 
having a 34 percent chance of being admitted compared with a 6 percent chance for non-legacy 
applicants (Belkin, 2020). Legacy gives the children of graduates the equivalent of a 160-point 
bump on the SAT over non-legacy applicants (Espenshade et al., 2004).  
 Although these admission rates confirm that legacy applicants are admitted more often 
than their non-legacy peers, understanding the magnitude of the legacy advantage is complicated 
by the possibility that children of alumni may be systematically different from the pool of 





colleges and universities. Thus, simple comparisons of the admission differences between 
legacies and non-legacies that overlook the quality of applicants—their GPAs, standardized test 
scores, or extracurricular accomplishments—may significantly overstate any legacy advantage in 
admissions. Exploring the tension between various admissions preferences, Shulman and Bowen 
(2000) contrast the likelihood of admission for differing groups—legacies, historically 
marginalized students of color, and athletes—while controlling for differences in SAT scores. In 
their study of male applicants to one particular institution, legacies received a 20 percent 
admissions advantage in 1976, compared to a 49 percent advantage for historically marginalized 
students of color and a 23 percent advantage for athletes. By 1999, the admissions advantages for 
legacies, historically marginalized students of color, and athletes were 25 percent, 18 percent, 
and 48 percent, respectively. The statistics for female applicants revealed similar percentages and 
changes across time. While the tension between various types of preferences is common in 
higher education, with New York City’s gifted-and-talented programs the discussion largely 
focuses on the inequities perpetuated by sibling priorities. 
Legacy Policies: Racial Composition. While the justification for such legacy policies has 
changed over time—they are now intended to promote institutional loyalty and increase alumni 
volunteerism and donation rates, rather than to disadvantage certain groups of applicants—
legacy policies continue to have a negative effect on the admissions prospects of immigrants and 
historically marginalized students of color, whose parents are less likely to have attended college 
in the U.S. Because legacies at America’s most selective postsecondary institutions are 
disproportionately White (Howell & Turner, 2004), awarding preference to children or close 
relatives of alumni have hindered racial diversity (Megalli, 1995; Hurtado et al., 1998). It is 





benefit families who are White. Megalli (1995) found that in 1995, 96 percent of all living Ivy 
League alumni were White. In agreement, Cross (1994) argues that “the established White 
admissions advantage replicates itself” through policies that favor children of alumni because the 
overwhelming majority of alumni from elite colleges and universities are White (p. 50). Guinier 
(2001) deems legacy preferences “proxies for privilege” on the basis that they favor children of 
well-educated families who, it is assumed, possess greater-than-average wealth (p. B12). 
Although Howell and Turner (2004) predict that the once extreme racial imbalance in the 
composition of potential legacy applicants will eventually change in coming decades, it will be 
some number of years before the representation of students in the legacy pool resembles the 
share of students of color in the student body or the population of college-age students.  
While the literature on the legacy preferences has parallels to sibling preferences, the two 
are also very distinct. As mentioned, sibling preferences apply to students with a sibling 
currently enrolled in the school, whereas legacy preferences apply to students with parents or 
grandparents who were once enrolled in the university. Furthermore, while gifted-and-talented 
admissions are restricted to eligible candidates who score above the test score cutoff, there are no 
such formal eligibility criteria in higher education admissions. Nonetheless, higher education 
legacy preferences do provide some context for understanding sibling preferences. As with 
legacy preferences, although defenders of sibling preferences argue that the preferences are not 
intentionally discriminatory, the preferences have a racially discriminatory effect. Since legacy 
policies improve admissions prospects for alumni children, the racial composition of students 
admitted under legacy preferences is inevitably affected by the racial composition of the 
previous generation of college students. College students of previous generations were less 





the current generation of admits. Similarly, since sibling policies prioritize admissions for 
children of current gifted-and-talented students, the racial/ethnic and socioeconomic composition 
of students admitted under sibling preferences is inevitably affected by the composition of the 
existing students. The current student body of gifted-and-talented programs lacks diversity, and 
sibling priorities allow these current enrollments to influence the next cohort of admits.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
The issue of the lack of diversity in gifted-and-talented programs can be framed by what 
Lasswell (1958) defined as the crux of politics, a question of “who gets what, when, and how.” 
This definition of politics underscores that resources are always limited and that the allocation of 
limited resources inevitably connects politics and power. According to Lasswell (1958), politics 
is the determination of who receives what benefits, when they receive the benefits, and the 
methods by which they receive them. Conversely, politics is also the determination of who is 
denied what benefits, when and how long they are denied, and the methods by which they are 
denied. Whether considering education, fire or police patrol, libraries, parks and recreation, 
social services like welfare or food subsidies, public transportation, or waste management, urban 
studies scholars have engaged in a discussion about whether its allocation—the who, the what, 
the when, and the how—is fair. The notion of fairness introduces a larger debate about the equity 
versus equality of service distribution. For the purposes of my study, I present three constructs to 
explore the role that bureaucracies play in the distribution of resources and services of gifted-
and-talented programming, to understand how parents navigate the admissions system, and to 
determine whether the system is defined to ameliorate or reinforce existing social inequities in 





formal rules, then review neo-institutional theories on informal rules, and lastly, explore political 
science theories on electoral interests and systemic power to consider how families navigate the 
bureaucratic rules of the admissions process and how bureaucratic rules might ameliorate or 
reinforce existing social inequities.  
Bureaucratic Decision Rules Model and Formal Rules 
The bureaucratic decision-making model emphasizes the role of bureaucrats in allocating 
resources, such as gifted-and-talented services, according to professional norms that are 
independent of politics and power. Applying an institutional theory approach, Weber’s (1978) 
theories on modern bureaucracy and rational-legal authority suggest that organizations are 
“systems of power or domination in which the leader exercises control over and through a 
hierarchy of officials who both receive and give orders” (Scott & Davis, 2007, p. 50). According 
to Weber, in bureaucratic structures both subordinates and superiors behave more predictably 
because the specificity of their role’s responsibilities, the clarity of hierarchical relationships, and 
the short- and longer-term gains of efficiency and predictability. From this formal, rational 
perspective, depersonalization and expert knowledge allow individual participants to serve as a 
“cog in an ever-moving mechanism” where the individual is a rational actor who seeks only to 
advance the goals of the organization (Scott & Davis, 2007, p. 52). Building on this theory, some 
political scientists (Meier et al., 2000; Smith & Meier, 1994, 1995) have refuted the argument 
that bureaucracy leads to inefficiencies and poor performance and instead countered that 
bureaucracies develop because school systems need administrative capacity to function 
effectively. For example, using panel data of over 1,000 school districts over a seven-year 
period, Meier et al. (2000) found that bureaucratic policies were designed and implemented in 





the lack of diversity in gifted-and-talented programs that formerly had a decentralized 
admissions process by implementing a centralized system with clear admissions rules to increase 
diversity in gifted-and-talented enrollments. Based on the argument that policy design and 
decision rules can be neutral or even progressive in intent and effect, Weber’s theory on 
bureaucratic decisions rule asserts that government implemented policies, such as the current test 
score cutoffs and sibling preferences, would help ameliorate existing inequities in access to 
gifted-and-talented services. 
Neo-Institutionalism and Informal Rules 
While the rational systems framework is useful when discussing the intention of formal 
policies, critics have argued that it becomes more difficult to apply when discussing the actual 
outcomes and informal practices of policies. One primary criticism of the rational choice theory 
is that it overlooks individual needs. According to Selznick’s natural systems theory, 
organizations have complex and uncertain goals and processes to attain those goals. Unlike the 
rational systems, the natural systems lens is based on how personal characteristics and relations 
influence the behavior of individuals and may create a disparity between the stated and official 
goals and structures and what is actually practiced within an organization (Scott & Davis, 2007). 
Critiques of the rational systems theory spurred the rise of theories of neo-institutionalism, which 
demonstrate a clear conceptual shift in the analysis of organizations; the formerly closed system 
analysis shifted to an open system. Neo-institutionalism asserts an ecological model where the 
environments of organizations are critical to understanding organizational dynamics (Scott, 
2001). Whereas old institutionalism focuses on the product, neo-institutionalism instead focuses 
on the process. To garner legitimacy and survive, organizations become susceptible to 





structures that have already attained legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). However, 
according to institutional theory, local actors are more concerned with gaining legitimacy than 
with adhering to specific institutional goals or structures, and therefore, organizations may 
project the image that they are following the rational model by adopting practices but are doing 
so ceremonially rather than technically (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In other words, the concept of 
loose-coupling suggests that organizations buffer their formal structures from the uncertainties of 
technical activities (Weick, 1976). The loose-coupling between school governance structures and 
the technical core of schools serves as an explanation for the separation between policy design 
and policy implementation, where instruction (the technical activity) may not actually reflect the 
original intentions envisioned by the board of education (the rational institution).  
Expanding on how policies are interpreted and enacted at the local level, as Jones (1980) 
notes, “[d]ecision makers in bureaucratic organizations seldom employ the full-blown rational 
decision-making model of evaluating all alternatives and selecting the one that most efficiently 
realizes organizational goals” (p. 17). In contrast to the rational-, norm-, and efficiency-centered 
bureaucracy, other scholars in both institutional theory and political science have explored 
alternatives to the rational bureaucrat with respect to individual discretion and collective 
adaptability. For instance, Zucker (1977, 1991) underscored the agency of individual actors in 
the process of institutionalization. Principal-agent theory and the concept of street-level 
bureaucrats help explain how individuals not only are the face of policy but also act as liaisons 
between policymakers and citizens—they are real policy makers who hold a high level of 
autonomy to exercise day-to-day discretionary power and policy interpretation (Lipsky, 1971; 
Lipsky, 1980; Weatherly & Lipsky, 1977). Although variation in how local actors exercise their 





2006; Carlson & Planty, 2012), it is not clear how you should apply every individual law or rule 
universally to all situations. For example, teachers might function as street-level bureaucrats and 
informally exercise their judgement by encouraging or discouraging certain children to 
participate in gifted-and-talented programming. While teachers might reinforce the lack of 
diversity in gifted-and-talented programs if they make assumptions about families’ value of 
education or interest in gifted services, they might moderate or counteract these differences by 
reaching out to inform parents of children they think could benefit from gifted services that 
might otherwise not know about gifted-and-talented programs or show interest. Therefore, in 
some instances, we would want local actors to exercise some judgment and discretion, and their 
use of discretionary power would in fact increase efficiency. In general, neo-institutionalism 
underscores the difference between policy design and policy implementation. Despite designing 
a system with clear admissions rules with the intent increase diversity in gifted-and-talented 
enrollments, the implementation and practice of such rules may not actually reflect the original 
intentions, which could either serve to encourage or discourage diversity.  
Electoral Interests and Systemic Power 
In contrast to scholars of Weber’s rational system, political science scholars of the 
electoral-interest model and systemic power suggest that bureaucratic decision rules are destined 
to reinforce the advantage of the already advantaged. According to the electoral-interest model, 
the pattern of service allocation reflects the electoral considerations of politicians. It is important 
to underscore that political explanations assume that wealth is not the only resource that matters 
in determining political power or influence. The electoral-interest model accounts for the fact 
that there are more non-wealthy voters than there are wealthy ones and instead suggests that 





goal of elected officials is electoral victories, they are attentive to voting patterns and how 
decisions regarding service distribution may influence voting patterns. The explanation assumes 
that resources are strategically distributed to favor residents, irrespective of wealth, who 
have played a central role in their electoral victory in the past or who have the potential to play a 
role in future elections. Wolfinger (1972) referred to this as machine politics: “the manipulation 
of certain incentives to partisan political participation: favoritism based on political criteria in 
personnel decisions, contracting, and administration of the laws” (p. 374).  
In contrast to the rationale that political power is irrespective of wealth, the theory of 
systemic power, which is defined by “the impact of the larger socioeconomic system on the 
predispositions of public officials,” posits that politicians and elected officials favor and protect 
the interests of the advantaged at the expense of others (Stone, 1980, p. 979). Although not 
necessarily intentionally, elected officials are predisposed to favor the interest of the advantaged 
over the disadvantaged because they are subject to a hierarchical system of stratification that 
motivates them to. Based on this theory, although unintentionally, the gifted-and-talented 
admissions rules may be designed to further advantage the already advantaged families. Thus, 
admissions policies, such as test score cutoffs and sibling preferences, would reinforce the 
existing inequities and lack of diversity in gifted-and-talented programs.  
Overall, the bureaucratic decisions rules model, neo-institutionalism, and theories on 
electoral interests and systemic power are useful for understanding whether formal admissions 
rules currently implemented by the NYCDOE promote or limit diversity of gifted-and-talented 
programs. The three constructs provide a framework for my investigation of whether families 
can effectively and efficiently navigate the admissions process, whether the admissions rules as 





they serve. Figure 2.1 provides a visual for the various stages of the gifted-and-talented 
admissions process: the four steps where families must take initiative to engage with the process 
—requesting to test, testing, applying, and enrolling—and the two steps where formal 
bureaucratic rules filter demand for the program—test score criteria and admissions preferences.  
In addressing research question 1, I hypothesize that an admissions system that relies on 
family-initiated engagement will reflect the existing social inequities in families and 
communities, with lower participation from low-income, Black and Hispanic families who have 
historically been underrepresented in gifted-and-talented programs. When access to gifted 
services depends on families getting information and affirmatively making choices to participate, 
the sociodemographic composition of families engaged at the onset of the admissions process 
will not reflect the diversity of the population. Given prevailing patterns of privilege and power, 
a referral process where parents or teachers recommend students for screening for gifted services 
will reflect differences in cultural values, education, income, and race/ethnicity with more 
educated, higher-income, White families requesting testing. These differences will carry through 
latter stages and be magnified in enrollment.  
Addressing research question 2, I explore how the diversity of gifted-and-talented 
programs is also shaped by admissions policies, such as test score cutoffs and sibling 
preferences. I introduce two competing hypotheses: admissions criteria and priorities will 
ameliorate the lack of diversity in gifted-and-talented engagement or exacerbate it. On one hand, 
according to Weber’s rational theory, a centralized system based on admissions rules could 
encourage a meritocratic system with greater diversity. Although family and community 
background and a referral system might initially cause a lack of diversity in gifted-and-talented 





designed to favor equity and diversity, might ameliorate the initial lack of diversity. On the other 
hand, according to theories on electoral interests and systemic power, bureaucratic rules might 
reflect the existing power distribution and thus, end up perpetuating the existing inequities. For 
example, despite a greater presence of educated, wealthy, and White families at beginning of the 
admissions process, screening based on test scores to make placement decisions might lead to 
even fewer low-income, Black, and Hispanic families. According to this hypothesis, as with test 
score cutoffs, we would again see a shift in diversity of those receiving an offer because offers 
are made based on admissions rules including sibling priority and CSD eligibility. These 
preferences, in particular sibling priority, might favor advantaged, White families who already 
have access to gifted-and-talented programs.  
Figure 2.1 The Gifted-and-Talented Admissions Process. 3 
 






Overall, the literature on the family and community background, early cognitive 
inequalities, test preparation and legacy preferences in higher education, formal bureaucratic 
decision rules, neo-institutionalism and informal rules, and electoral interests and systemic 
power suggest the need for evidence on how families and communities navigate bureaucratic 
admissions policies and how the admission policies either improve or limit diversity in gifted-
and-talented admissions. The relative scarcity of work on the effects of how family engagement 
coupled with bureaucratic decision rules shape diversity indicates a need for more research 
investigating their links to diversity in gifted-and-talented programs. While studies of early child 
cognitive development, shadow education, and legacy preferences suggest that the test score 
criteria and sibling preferences might unintentionally reinforce the existing lack of diversity in 
gifted-and-talented education, the extant literature lacks evidence of shadow education and 
legacy-like preferences at the elementary school level in gifted-and-talented programs. 
Therefore, I employ methodology that helps reduce differences between students based on 
race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status; accounts for the nested nature of students within 
neighborhoods; examines each step of the admissions process; and explores how admissions 
rules shape gifted-and-talented candidates in an effort to help academics, educators, and 






Chapter 3. Data and Methodology 
 
My study focuses on two central questions surrounding the diversity of gifted-and-
talented programs in New York City. First, I examine the diversity of family participation in 
gifted-and-talented admissions at each stage in the process. Do families who request testing, test, 
apply, and enroll their children in gifted-and-talented programs reflect diverse backgrounds? 
Second, I investigate the impact that some admissions policies have on the diversity of gifted-
and-talented programs. Do the gifted-and-talented admissions criteria and priorities advantage 
certain students? In this chapter, I discuss these questions in greater detail and outline the data 
and methods that I will employ to answer them. However, before diving into the methodological 
details it is important to briefly discuss the context of gifted-and-talented admissions in New 
York City. 
 
Gifted-and-Talented Admissions in New York City 
The vast majority of gifted-and-talented programs across the nation are simple pull-out 
programs in which gifted students are removed (or “pulled-out”) from a heterogeneous 
classroom to spend a few hours per week with academic peers. The students meet with a teacher 
to engage in enrichment or specialized content that may or may not be related to the curriculum 
being taught in the regular classroom. However, in New York City, gifted-and-talented programs 
are conducted in separate classrooms and sometimes separate schools makes the demographic 
disparities particularly stark. 
Unlike most other districts, in New York City, admissions to gifted-and-talented 
programs are through a separate, multi-step process from the regular elementary school 





kindergarten (Mader et al., 2018), families must still go through the process of navigating a 
system of school types including zoned programs, non-zoned programs, magnet schools, dual 
language programs, and charter schools, which each have a separate kindergarten application 
process. While all students turning five are required to apply to kindergarten for enrollment, 
participating in the gifted-and-talented admissions process is optional, as are all of the 
alternatives listed above. 
Prior to 2008, the gifted-and-talented admissions process was completely decentralized 
and criteria, which might have included teacher recommendations, interviews, and/or 
observations, varied from program to program. Some parents, NYCDOE officials, and media 
outlets long complained that the process was not transparent or fair. Former Chancellor Joel I. 
Klein described the gifted-and-talented classrooms as “a hodgepodge of offerings with varying, 
and often opaque, admissions criteria that tend to favor children with well-connected parents” 
(Gootman, 2008). In fact, one of the NYCDOE’s stated goals with centralizing the gifted-and-
talented admissions process was to increase the enrollment of Black and Hispanic students into 
gifted-and-talented programs. In an effort to increase diverse gifted-and-talented enrollments, the 
policy change called for offering more gifted-and-talented programs across the city, testing more 
children (because testing is free beginning in 2008), setting a unified cutoff score to the 90th 
percentile, and having a more standardized application process citywide. However, opponents of 
the policy change warned that using standardized scores alone would reduce diversity and lead to 
few Black and Hispanic students and low-income students in the gifted-and-talented classrooms. 
For one, evidence suggests family income strongly and significantly influences performance on 
standardized test, with students from highest quartiles of wealth scoring better for a variety of 





Biddle, 2014). Children from wealthier families are more likely to pick up the kind of knowledge 
necessary to understand and complete standardized tests. Furthermore, some evidence points to 
standardized tests being racially and culturally biased (Haimson & Kjellberg, 2009). Following 
the policy change, Diane Ravitch, a historian of the New York City school system, commented 
on how the NYCDOE’s centralized gifted-and-talented admissions “halved the proportion” of 
Black and Hispanic students in gifted-and-talented programs: “Any education researcher could 
have predicted this result, because children from advantaged homes are far likelier to know the 
vocabulary on a standardized test than children who lack the same advantages” (Ravitch, 2010, 
p. 89). 
Since 2008, when the centralized policy was changed to use a single test score as the sole 
criterion, parents can choose to have their children tested to become eligible for two types of 
gifted-and-talented programs—district and citywide. District gifted-and-talented options are 
community school district programs for students who score above the 90th percentile. These 
gifted-and-talented programs are co-located within certain neighborhood schools that also house 
general education programs for students living in the neighborhood. City gifted-and-talented 
options are for children who score above the 97th percentile on the gifted-and-talented tests. 
These students become eligible for the five citywide gifted-and-talented schools, which are open 
to students from all five boroughs if space is available.4 
The gifted-and-talented admissions process is a multistep process that requires 
considerable advanced planning and attentiveness to various deadlines. To begin to engage in the 
gifted-and-talented admissions process, parents are first required to fill out an online “Request 
 
4 The five citywide G&T schools include NEST+M (New Exploration into Science, Technology and Math) in 
Manhattan (K-12), The Anderson School in Manhattan (K-8), TAG for Young Scholars in Manhattan (K-8), 





for G&T Testing” form in the fall. All families who request testing must then take their children 
to get tested at their assigned place and time. Families that miss the deadlines for test registration 
and exam administration must wait an entire school year before their child can be tested. After 
receiving their children’s scores in the spring, those who score at or above the 90th percentile are 
eligible to apply and must rank the gifted-and-talented schools on the application form. Based on 
an array for factors such as sibling priority, percentile rank, ranked program preferences, and seat 
availability, select applicants then receive one offer to a program. If a student declines his/her 
seat he/she do not get put on a waiting list or receive another offer (New York City, Department 
of Education, 2019).  
There are several admissions priority rules that govern what types of students get priority 
over others in the gifted-and-talented admissions process. For gifted-and-talented programs, 
sibling priority states that if a child applies to a gifted-and-talented program at a school where 
their sibling is currently enrolled, they have an admissions priority to attend that program, too. In 
order for a child to get sibling priority, their sibling must be pre-registered or enrolled at the 
school or a District 75 program in the same building and be entering a grade between 
kindergarten and grade 12 the following fall. In other words, sibling priority gives applicants 
with older siblings in the school a much better chance of admission than children with similar 
scores who do not have priority status, 
District gifted-and-talented programs give first priority to sibling applicants who get an 
overall gifted-and-talented score of 90 or above. After all eligible siblings are placed, non-sibling 
applicants are placed by overall gifted-and-talented score. Eligible students may apply to any 
program in any district across the city, but applicants with district priority to a given program 





the district where they are zoned for elementary school. In general, families have priority for 
district programs in their zoned district. However, in some cases, such as when a district does not 
offer a gifted-and-talented program, applicants may have a priority for one or more program 
options in neighboring districts. Children who are zoned to a school with a gifted-and-talented 
program do not have any additional priority to that school over other students in the district. First 
priority is given to siblings with district priority. Second priority is to siblings without district 
priority. Third priority is to non-siblings with district priority. Fourth priority is to non-siblings 
without district priority. It is only within a priority group that actual scores come into play, and 
when there are multiple students with the same priority and score, offers are randomly assigned 
(New York City, Department of Education, 2019). 
Citywide gifted-and-talented programs accept students from all boroughs without 
preference for their district of residence. Siblings who get an overall gifted-and-talented score of 
97 or above are placed first according to their overall gifted-and-talented score. After all eligible 
siblings are placed, non‑sibling applicants are placed by overall gifted-and-talented score. As 
with district programs, when there are multiple students with the same priority and score, offers 
are randomly assigned. 
 
Data and Methods 
Data 
My analyses employ longitudinal administrative data on public school students in New 
York City, the nation’s largest public school district, which serves over 1.1 million students in 
over 1,800 schools. The city serves a diverse student body: 41 percent are Hispanic, 26 percent 





historically marginalized students of color including multi-racial students; 14 percent are English 
Language Learners; 20 percent are students with disabilities; and nearly three-quarters (74 
percent) are economically disadvantaged (New York City, Department of Education, 2019). My 
research follows four cohorts from fall 2014 through fall 2017 of gifted-and-talented applicants, 
kindergarten applicants, and enrolled kindergartners (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1). Although I 
have access to data for fall 2012 and fall 2013 cohorts, the samples from these years are 
fundamentally different because the kindergarten admissions process was decentralized and 
managed by schools prior to fall 2014. Therefore, the data for those two years exclude students 
who only engaged in the kindergarten admissions process managed by schools and who did not 
engage in gifted-and-talented admissions or enroll in a New York City public school for 
kindergarten. Since the fall 2012 and fall 2013 data restrict me from capturing the broader 
population of families that engage in the NYCDOE’s admissions processes or enroll in a 
NYCDOE school, I deliberately chose to exclude them from my analyses. My sample is not 
representative of all four- and five-year-old’s in the New York City, as there are families living 
in the city who never apply to or enroll in the NYCDOE’s pre-kindergarten, kindergarten, or 
gifted-and-talented programs and send their children to private schools from the beginning. My 
sample is representative of families who engage with the NYCDOE at some point, whether they 
participate in the gifted-and-talented and/or kindergarten admissions process or enroll their child 
in pre-kindergarten or kindergarten at a NYCDOE school. Table 3.1 shows a breakdown of my 
sample population from fall 2014 through fall 2017. While less than 20 percent of families 
participated in gifted-and-talented admissions,5 over two-thirds participate in kindergarten 
 
5 This does not include families that moved to NYC later in the school year who missed the deadline. There is a two- 
to three-week period in June when families who have recently moved to NYC can request testing. Summer testing 
takes place in early-July. Families who miss this summer testing window must wait to participate in gifted-and-





admissions, and over 80 percent of families who engaged in the gifted-and-talented or 
kindergarten admissions process ended up enrolling in a NYCDOE school for kindergarten.  
Table 3.1. Sample Population (n=397,078). 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Sample Population. 
 
Gifted-and-talented admissions data include information for all students who requested 
testing including their test scores, application choices, and school to which they received an 
offer. Kindergarten admissions data similarly includes information for all students who applied 
Ct. Pct.1
Total Sample Population 397,078
Students who participated in the G&T admissions process 69,678 17.5
1 Participated in only the G&T admissions process 15,830 4.0
2 Participated in both the G&T and K admissions processes but did not enroll in a NYC DOE school for 
kindergarten 6,487 1.6
3 Participated in only the G&T admissions process and enrolled in a NYC DOE school for kindergarten 6,961 1.8
4 Participated in both the G&T and K admissions processes and enrolled in a NYC DOE school for 
kindergarten 40,400 10.2
Students who participated in the K admissions process 269,698 67.9
5 Participated in only the K admissions process 47,433 11.9
6 Participated in only the K admissions process and enrolled in a NYC DOE school for kindergarten 175,378 44.2
Students who enrolled in a NYC DOE school for kindergarten 327,328 82.4
7 Enrolled in a NYC DOE school for kindergarten but did not participate in either G&T or K admissions 
process 104,589 26.3















1 Participated in only the G&T admissions process
2 Participated in both the G&T and K admissions processes
but did not enroll in a NYC DOE school for kindergarten
3 Participated in only the G&T admissions process and
enrolled in a NYC DOE school for kindergarten
4 Participated in both the G&T and K admissions processes
and enrolled in a NYC DOE school for kindergarten
5 Participated in only the K admissions process
6 Participated in only the K admissions process and
enrolled in a NYC DOE school for kindergarten
7 Enrolled in a NYC DOE school for kindergarten but did not





to kindergarten, their application choices, and school they received an offer to. Enrollment data 
includes students who enrolled in a NYCDOE traditional public school or charter school. 
Enrollment data also contains student-level sociodemographic measures, such as gender, 
race/ethnicity, home language, disability status, etc. Since gifted-and-talented admissions data 
and kindergarten admissions data do not include such measures, for 18 percent of the sample 
who did not enroll in a NYCDOE school for pre-kindergarten or kindergarten, I supplement 
these data with the American Community Survey 2016 and 2017 5-year estimates of census tract 
data.6 I used 2017 census tract data for Hispanic or Latino origin by race and nativity and 
citizenship status in the U.S., as well as 2016 census tract data for educational attainment for the 
population 25 years and over, limited English speaking households, and median income in the 
past 12 months.  
Sample 
When possible, both my descriptive and analytic samples include all New York City 
gifted-and-talented applicants, kindergarten applicants, and enrolled kindergarten students from 
fall 2014 through fall 2017 (n=100,212 in 2014; n=98,144 in 2015; n=98,260 in 2016; 
n=100,462 in 2017; Table 3.1). Notably, this sample includes students enrolled in charter schools 
as well as District 75, a highly specialized instructional support program for students with 
significant challenges, such as autism spectrum disorders, significant cognitive delays, emotional 
disturbances, sensory impairments, or multiple disabilities. The sample is representative of 
families who engage in the NYCDOE’s admissions processes and excludes families who only 
 
6 To the extent possible I try to use the most current version of American Community Survey data possible (2017). 
However, I noticed that for select datasets (educational attainment, limited English speaking household, and median 
income) the 2017 data was missing data for 31% of students, while the 2016 data included such data for nearly all 
students. Therefore, to minimize missing data issues, I referred to 2016 data instead of the most recent year for these 





apply to and enroll in private schools. For research question 2, my sample is limited to fall 2017 
data. Although the sibling priority was in effect for all four years, the data shared only includes a 
sibling priority indicator in the fall 2017 data.7 
Measures 
Gifted-and-Talented Indicators. I composed a dichotomous measure indicating whether a 
student has requested testing (yes=1, no=0). I also constructed one categorical measure 
indicating whether a student has not requested testing, requested testing but not tested, or 
requested testing and tested and another dichotomous measure indicating whether they tested 
(yes=1, no=0). Of students who tested, I created a categorical measure indicating whether a 
student was ineligible for district programs (score<90), eligible for district programs only 
(90≤score<97), or eligible for both district and city programs (score≥97). I employed a 
continuous measure indicating how a student performed on the gifted-and-talented test. This 
measure, which I refer to as a test score, is a percentile rank between 1 and 99 that shows the 
relative standing of an individual student compared to their same-aged peers. I also composed 
dichotomous measures indicating whether a student applied to district program (yes=1, no=0), 
whether a student applied to city program (yes=1, no=0), whether a student has applied to any 
gifted-and-talented program (yes=1, no=0), whether a student received an offer to a district 
program (yes=1, no=0), and whether at student received an offer to a city program (yes=1, 
no=0), and whether a student has received an offer to any gifted-and-talented program (yes=1, 
no=0). I found less than 30 cases where students ineligible for district programs applied to such 
 
7 While the 2017 admissions data includes a flag for sibling priority to all the programs that a candidate applied to, 
this sibling priority variable was not available for prior years. I tried back into sibling preferences data for prior 
years. However, there was no way of deciphering all students with sibling priorities from those without. For 
example, based on the 2017 data, although I could easily differentiate sibling status for students who scored in the 
97th or 98th percentile and received their first choice offer over students who scored in the 99th percentile and did not 





programs and less than 10 cases where students ineligible for city programs applied to such 
programs. For these cases, I did not count them as having applied or having received an offer. I 
also created multiple measures related to enrollment. I constructed a categorical measure 
indicating whether a student left the NYCDOE school system, whether a student enrolled in a 
district school, or whether a student enrolled in a gifted-and-talented program. I also created a 
dichotomous measure indicating whether a student has enrolled in any NYCDOE school, 
including gifted-and-talented programs (yes=1, no=0). I employed a dichotomous measure for 
whether the candidate has sibling priority at the program applied to (yes=1, no=0). To determine 
whether a student has sibling priority at a program that he/she applied to, I composed a 
dichotomous measure indicating whether he has a sibling attending the program (yes=1, no=0). 
To distinguish whether a student has district priority at any a program, I also composed a 
dichotomous measure indicating whether he resides in the district of the program (yes=1, no=0). 
Lastly, to capture the demand of a gifted-and-talented program, I constructed a continuous 
demand measure as a ratio of applicants to seats.  
Student-Level Measures. For enrolled students, to account for student-level 
sociodemographic characteristics, I applied a series of dummy-coded measures that identify 
whether a student is Asian, Black, Hispanic, White, or of “other” race/ethnicity (including 
Native-American, multi-racial, or families who did not indicate a race). In multivariate models, 
White students serve as the comparison group. I also captured student gender (female=1, 
male=0), whether the student was an English Language Learner (ELL) (yes=1, no=0), received 
free or reduced-price lunch (yes=1, no=0), or had an Individualized Educational Plan (IEP) 
(yes=1, no=0) using dichotomous indicators.  





for some applicants, I explore students’ census tracts to estimate neighborhood 
sociodemographic characteristics. I employed students’ neighborhood race/ethnicity using 
continuous measures of the percentage of Asian, Black, Hispanic, White, and other race/ethnicity 
residents. The American Community Survey data does not provide race/ethnicity data by age 
group, so neighborhood race-ethnicity is inclusive of all residents and thus, may not necessarily 
reflect the child population. I also included a continuous measure of neighborhood percent U.S. 
citizen, which includes citizens born in the U.S., born in Puerto Rico or U.S. Island Areas, born 
abroad of American parent(s), or by naturalization. I used a continuous measure of neighborhood 
percent limited English speaking households. The race/ethnicity, citizenship, and English 
proficiency measures are based on all residents regardless of age and therefore, speak to the 
broader neighborhood effects, which can vary widely from child-level effects. I applied 
continuous measures of educational attainment of the population 25 years or over to determine 
students’ neighborhood percentage of those who have less than a high school diploma, have a 
high school diploma (including equivalency), have some college or associate’s degree, or have a 
bachelor’s degree or higher. Lastly, I captured neighborhood median income using a continuous 
measure.  
Elementary School Zone-Level Measures. Most kindergarten programs are zoned 
programs, which give the highest priority to students who live in the designated group of 
addresses call a zone. Therefore, I used aggregate measures of the students’ neighborhood-level 
measures described above for elementary school zone-level sociodemographic measures. For all 
analytic models, zone median income is grand-mean centered. 
In the interest of parsimony, I concentrate primarily on presenting analyses on the subset 





provides me with a more comprehensive portrait of the child (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, etc.) as 
well as his/her community (e.g., neighborhood and zone race/ethnicity, educational attainment, 
income, etc.). However, analyses of children with student-level data only capture families that 
enroll their child in a NYCDOE school for either pre-kindergarten and/or kindergarten and do 
not capture families who engage in the gifted-and-talented or kindergarten admissions processes 
but who do not enroll in a NYCDOE school for either pre-kindergarten or kindergarten. 
Therefore, although I am unable to speak to specific child attributes, analyses of all children with 
neighborhood- and zone-level data allow me to capture an understanding of a child’s community 
background. Aware that students with student-level data and all students may be systematically 
different, I make note of any differences between the two in my results. For example, differences 
may reflect that student-level analyses exclude wealthier families who have more resources and 
opportunities to enroll their children in private schools. 
Missing Data 
Table 3.2 presents missing data rates for key measures in my analyses. Student-level data 
is only available for those who end up enrolling in a NYCDOE public school. Based on my 
sample population, I am missing student-level data for about 14% of the total sample population, 
which includes children who engaged in gifted-and talented admission process and/or 
kindergarten admissions process but do not enroll in a NYCDOE school for pre-kindergarten or 
kindergarten. However, I have student-level data on gender, race/ethnicity, special education 
status, English proficiency, and free and reduced-price lunch status for all students who enrolled 
in a NYCDOE school for pre-kindergarten or kindergarten. In the absence of student-level data 
for those who neither enroll in a NYCDOE school for pre-kindergarten or kindergarten, rather 





zone-level data and another for students with both student-level and zone-level data. 
Neighborhood-level data is available for students with address data, and I am fortunate that from 
2014 through 2017 about 8 percent of students or less who participated in gifted-and-talented 
admissions are missing address data. While missing data is likely not random and could reflect 
differences in reporting or mobility, given that the percentage of cases was rather small, I 
dropped all students missing neighborhood-level data from my descriptive and analytic analyses. 
Table 3.2. Missing Data Rates for Key Variables (n=397,078). 
 
Methods 
Descriptive Approach. My first set of analyses details family gifted-and-talented 
admissions participation rates for the fall 2014 through fall 2017 cohorts. I describe the student- 















% Asian 31,826 8.0
% Black, non-Hispanic 31,826 8.0
% Hispanic 31,826 8.0
% White, non-Hispanic 31,826 8.0
% Other 31,826 8.0
% United States citizen 31,826 8.0
% Limited English speaking household 31,850 8.0
Educational attainment for the population 25 years and over
% Less than a high school diploma 31,826 8.0
% High school diploma or equivalency 31,826 8.0
% Some college or Associate’s degree 31,826 8.0
% Bachelor’s degree or higher 31,826 8.0









request testing; those who did test, those who requested testing but did not test, and those who 
did not request testing; those who did and did not apply; and those who enrolled in a gifted-and-
talented program, those who enrolled in any NYCDOE district school, and those who left the 
NYCDOE school system.  
In my second set of analyses, I similarly describe both student- and zone-level 
sociodemographic differences that distinguish families who were eligible for city programs, 
eligible for district programs only, and ineligible for any gifted-and-talented programs as well as 
families who did and did not receive an offer to a district program and those who did and did not 
receive an offer to a city program. To administer my descriptive analyses, I use t-tests for 
relationships between dichotomous and continuous student characteristics, chi-square analyses 
for categorical characteristics, and one-way Analysis of Variances for relationships between 
categorical and continuous characteristics.  
To address my second research question, specifically on the role of test score criteria in 
the diversity of candidates, it is helpful to understand the broader picture of how the composition 
of families engaging in the admissions process changed at each step. Thus, I create a bar graph to 
demonstrate the step-by-step change for each race/ethnicity group. For a closer look at the role of 
sibling priority, I describe zone-level sociodemographic differences that distinguish families who 
have sibling priority and those who do not using t-tests for relationships between dichotomous 
and continuous student characteristics, I also explore how offers to first choice district and city 
gifted-and-talented programs vary by both test score and sibling priority status.  
Analytic Approach: Gifted-and-Talented Admissions Processes and Sociodemographic 
Characteristics. To address research questions 1 and 2, when estimating the relationships 





testing, testing, applying, enrolling, test scores, or receiving an offer) and student- and zone-level 
attributes, I build two-level random effects models. While the traditional Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) techniques would allow me to estimate the relationship between the dependent variable 
and demographic independent variables both within and across elementary school zones, OLS 
regression has underlying assumptions that must be met. One of the assumptions is that 
observations of the error term are uncorrelated with each other. However, in my data it is likely 
that student-level demographic characteristics are correlated with elementary school zone-level 
demographic characteristics. A cursory comparison of OLS models (Tables 3.3-3.9 in Appendix) 
and RE models reveals that OLS estimates overstate the effects of student-level covariates 
because they capture the influence within zones. Therefore, I employ random effects models, 
which removes some of the differences within school zones. The models take into account the 
nested nature of students within zones by using multi-level modeling techniques. While these 
models are not causal and simply describe the nature and extent of inequality in gifted-and-
talented admissions, nesting the models allows me to examine both the student and zone 
characteristics that may contribute to the likelihood that a student engages in each stage of the 
admissions process. Multi-level random effects approaches provide more accurate standard 
errors than traditional OLS techniques (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 1999).  
With a particular interest in low-income students, within these models, I am able to use 
cross-level interactions—a “slopes-as-outcomes” approach (Seltzer, 1995)—to determine 
whether zone factors help explain the relationship between socioeconomic characteristics and the 
likelihood of requesting testing, testing, applying, enrolling. 
I describe my multi-level models below:  
Level 1:  Yij = π0ij + π1jFemaleij + π2jAsianij + π3jBlackij + π4jHispanicij + π5jOther ij  (1) 





Level 2:  π0ij = 𝛽𝛽00j +  𝛽𝛽01ijPctAsianij +  𝛽𝛽02ijPctBlackij +  𝛽𝛽03ijPctHispanicij +  (2) 
  𝛽𝛽04ijPctOtherij +  𝛽𝛽05ijPctCitizenij +  𝛽𝛽06ijPctLEPij +  𝛽𝛽07ijPctBachelorsij + 
  𝛽𝛽08ijIncomeij  + r00ij 
 π1ij = 𝛽𝛽10j +  𝛽𝛽11ijPctAsianij +  𝛽𝛽12ijPctBlackij +  𝛽𝛽13ijPctHispanicij +  (3) 
  𝛽𝛽14ijPctOtherij + 𝛽𝛽15ijPctCitizenij +  𝛽𝛽16ijPctLEPij +  𝛽𝛽17ijPctBachelorsij + 
  𝛽𝛽18ijIncomeij + r10ij 
 … 
 𝜋𝜋8ij = 𝛽𝛽80j +  𝛽𝛽81ijPctAsianij +  𝛽𝛽82ijPctBlackij +  𝛽𝛽83ijPctHispanicij +  (4) 
  𝛽𝛽84ijPctOtherij +  𝛽𝛽85ijPctCitizenij +  𝛽𝛽86ijPctLEPij +  𝛽𝛽87ijPctBachelorsij + 
  𝛽𝛽88ijIncomeij + r80i 
  
 My within-student (Level 1) analyses, equation (1) estimate the extent to which variance 
in the outcome for given student, where Yij is the engagement in gifted-and-talented admissions 
outcome (e.g., requesting testing, testing, applying, enrolling, test scores, or receiving an offer) 
for student i in elementary school zone j . π0ij is the predicted value for individual i in zone j for a 
male, White, English proficient, FRL ineligible, student without a disability. The model accounts 
for student sociodemographic covariates, including gender (Female), race/ethnicity (Asian, 
Black, Hispanic, Other), English proficiency (ELL), FRL eligibility (FRL), and disability status 
(SWD), and ϵij is the residual, unexplained variance associated with student i.  
My zone-level (Level 2) models, equations (2), (3), (4) then estimate the outcome as a 
function of elementary school zone sociodemographic characteristics, including the zone’s 
composition by race/ethnicity (PctAsian, PctBlack, PctHispanic, PctOther), citizenship 
(PctCitizen), English proficiency (PctLEP), college graduates (PctBachelors), and median 
income (Income), and where r00ij is the residual, unexplained variance associated with zone j. My 
final analyses entail “slopes-as-outcomes” models, which allow me to ascertain whether the 
relationship between engagement at a stage in the gifted-and-talented admissions process based 





zone-level socioeconomic variables, such as educational attainment and median income (Level 2 
variables). All analyses were conducted using Stata 15 software. 
 Analytic Approach: Offers to First Choice Gifted-and-Talented Program and 
Sociodemographic Characteristics. To further address research question 2 regarding how 
admissions rules advantage certain students, the analyses begin with simple regressions of 
likelihood of receiving an offer to the first-choice or top-three-choice city and district gifted-and-
talented programs on various bureaucratic admissions rules using equations (5), (6), (7), and (8) 
below: 
CityFirsti = 𝛽𝛽0i +  𝛽𝛽1iScorei +  𝛽𝛽2iDemandi +  𝛽𝛽3iSiblingi +  ϵi  (5) 
CityTop3i = 𝛽𝛽0i +  𝛽𝛽1iScorei +  𝛽𝛽2iDemandi +  𝛽𝛽3iSiblingi +  ϵi (6) 
DistrictFirsti = 𝛽𝛽0i +  𝛽𝛽1iScorei +  𝛽𝛽2iDemandi +  𝛽𝛽3iSiblingi +  𝛽𝛽4iDistricti  +  ϵi (7)  
DistrictTop3i = 𝛽𝛽0i +  𝛽𝛽1iScorei +  𝛽𝛽2iDemandi +  𝛽𝛽3iSiblingi +  𝛽𝛽4iDistricti +  ϵi (8) 
 
Where equation (5) predicts the likelihood of receiving an offer to a first-choice city program for 
student i, where equation (6) predicts the likelihood of receiving an offer to one of the top three 
choice city programs, and where equations (7) and (8) predict the likelihoods of receiving an 
offer to a first-choice and one of top three choice district programs. The models account for 
various admissions policies, such as test performance (Score), demand for the program 
(Demand), sibling preferences (Sibling), district preferences (District) and ϵi is the residual, 






Chapter 4. The Diversity of Family Engagement in 
Gifted-and-Talented Admissions 
 
The analyses in this chapter allow me to answer my first set of research questions as to 
the role of diversity in family decision-making and engagement throughout the gifted-and-
talented admissions process. In a referral process, families play the pivotal role of initiating 
interest in gifted-and-talented programs and continuing to follow through the multi-step process, 
including requesting testing, testing, applications, and enrollment. At the onset of the multi-stage 
admissions process, how diverse are the families who are engaging in gifted-and-talented 
admissions? Do the families requesting testing reflect the population of families with four- to 
five-year-old’s? At each subsequent step of the admissions process as the number of candidates 
trims down, how does the diversity of families still engaging in the gifted-and-talented 
admissions process change? Ultimately, who enrolls in NYCDOE district schools? To 
understand how the family engagement with the admissions process impact the diversity of 
gifted-and-talented programs, I begin by analyzing how family participation in requesting testing 
and testing vary by sociodemographic characteristics and then explore whether there are  
sociodemographic differences in applications and enrollment in district schools.  
 
Requesting Testing 
Who Requests Testing?: Descriptive Results 
The first step of the gifted-and-talented admissions process is families requesting testing. 
Table 4.1 shows the associations between requesting testing and sociodemographic attributes. 
Among all students, these sociodemographic characteristics include students’ elementary school 





attainment, and median income. Among students who enrolled in a NYCDOE school for pre-
kindergarten and/or kindergarten, I also have student-level characteristics, including gender, 
race/ethnicity, disability status, English proficiency, and free or reduced-price lunch eligibility. 
Students with Student-Level Data. Among students who enrolled in a NYCDOE school 
for pre-kindergarten and/or kindergarten (n=338,694)—the subset of my sample for which I have 
student-level data—my results suggest there is an association between requesting testing and 
student-level sociodemographic characteristics (Figures 4.1; all differences p<0.001). I find that 
slightly more families of girls request testing than those of boys. I also find a relationship 
between requesting testing and students’ race/ethnicity. Of students who request testing, over 
half are White or Asian and 40 percent are Black or Hispanic. In contrast, of students who do not 
request testing, approximately 70 percent are Black or Hispanic. Furthermore, I find a difference 
in students’ disability status, English proficiency, and FRL eligibility status between those who 
request testing and their peers who do not. Of students who request testing, less than 10 percent 
are ELLs and SWDs and nearly half are FRL eligible. However, of their peers who do not 







Figure 4.1. Among Students with Student-Level Data, Requesting Testing by Student Sociodemographic 
Characteristics 
 
My results also suggest that there are differences in requesting testing by neighborhood 
sociodemographic characteristics (Figure 4.2; all differences p<0.001). I find that students who 
request testing live in areas that have proportionately more Asian and White residents and less 
Black and Hispanic residents than the areas their peers who do not request testing live. On 
average, students who request testing reside in communities that are about 13 percentage points 
more White, 11 percentage points less Hispanic, and 7 percentage points less Black than the 
neighborhoods of their peers who do not request testing. Compared to their peers who do not 
request testing, students who request testing also reside in neighborhoods with a slightly greater 
proportion of individuals who are U.S. citizens and with a slightly lower proportion of limited 
English-speaking households. With respect to socioeconomic variables, I find a distinct 
difference between the residential neighborhoods of families who request testing and of their 
counterparts who do not request testing. Overall, students who request testing reside in 
neighborhoods that are more educated. For example, on average, students who request testing 



































and on average about 11 percentage points more adults with a bachelor’s degree or higher. 
Furthermore, students who request testing also reside in neighborhoods with a higher median 
income than their peers who do not request testing. Neighborhood median incomes were on 
average approximately $13,200 or over one-quarter higher for those who request testing.  
Figure 4.2. Among Students with Student-Level Data, Requesting Testing by Neighborhood Sociodemographic 
Characteristics 
 
All Students. Among all students (n=365,103), I find similar differences in requesting 
testing by neighborhoods sociodemographic characteristics as I did for the subset of students 
with student-level data (Figure 4.3; all differences p<0.001). The noteworthy differences include 
that students who request testing reside in neighborhoods that are proportionately even more 
White, more educated and more wealthy than their peers who do not request testing. Students 
who request testing live in neighborhoods that have 15 percentage points more White residents, 
13 percentage points more residents with a bachelor’s degree, and neighborhood median incomes 
approximately $16,600 or one-third higher than those who do not request testing. These 
differences between all students and the subset of students with student-level data suggest that 
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admissions but enroll their children elsewhere for pre-kindergarten and kindergarten. 
Figure 4.3. Among All Students, Requesting Testing by Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics 
 
From the beginning, more Asian and White families and higher socioeconomic status 






























% Asian % Black %
Hispanic

















Table 4.1. Requesting Testing and Sociodemographic Characteristics. 
 
  
Non-RFTers RFTers Non-RFTers RFTers









English Language Learners 0.22*** 0.08
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible 0.76*** 0.47
Students with Disabilities 0.18*** 0.07
Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity 
% Asian 13.70*** 18.18 13.73*** 17.46
% Black, non-Hispanic 24.97*** 18.41 2470*** 17.71
% Hispanic 36.18*** 25.02 35.93*** 23.88
% Other 2.73*** 2.84 2.73*** 2.86
% White, non-Hispanic 22.42*** 35.56 22.91*** 38.09
% United States citizen 81.27*** 83.30 81.32*** 83.75
% Limited English-speaking household 18.34*** 16.28 18.25*** 15.29
Educational attainment of 25 years and over
% Less than a high school diploma 24.49*** 18.13 24.31*** 17.06
% High school diploma or equivalency 26.79*** 23.57 26.61*** 22.26
% Some college or Associate’s degree 21.64*** 20.43 21.54*** 19.69
% Bachelor’s degree or higher 27.09*** 37.86 27.55*** 40.99
Median income 50,971*** 50,971*** 51,612*** 68,209            
~p <0.10;*p <0.05; **p <0.01; p <0.001***
(n=338,694) (n=365,103)





Who Requests Testing?: Analytic Results 
To determine whether requesting testing is linked to specific sociodemographic attributes 
on an adjusted basis, I applied a multi-level model estimating the probability parents request 
testing (see Table 4.2). 
Students with Student-Level Data. Model 1 indicates the relationship between requesting 
testing and student-level sociodemographic characteristics among a subset of children with 
student-level data (n=338,694; all differences p<0.001). Accounting for all other student 
characteristic, I find that families are slightly more likely to request testing for their daughters 
than for their sons. Compared to their White peers, parents of Asian children are 7 percent more 
likely to request testing, but parents of Black and Hispanic children are slightly less likely—6 
and 7 percent respectively—to request testing. Furthermore, parents of ELLs (11 percent), FRL 
eligible students (13 percent), and SWDs (9 percent) are less likely to request testing than their 
non-ELL, non-FRL eligible, and non-SWD counterparts.  
 In Model 2, I introduce elementary school zone-level sociodemographic characteristics. 
Adjusting for all else, my results suggest that students residing in zones with higher proportions 
of Asian and Black residents are slightly more likely to request testing (p<0.05), while students 
residing in zones higher proportions of other race/ethnicity residents are less likely to request 
testing (p<0.001). Interestingly, students residing in zones with a higher percentage of limited 
English-speaking households are slightly more likely to request testing (p<0.01). Controlling for 
all other variables, I find that a 10 percent increase in the proportion of college graduates predicts 
a 2 percent increase in the probability of requesting testing (p<0.001), but that each $10,000 
increase in median zone income is associated with a 1 percent decrease in the probability of 





access to information and resources to take advantage of gifted-and-talented programs, when 
adjusting for zone educational attainment, higher income families might be less likely to request 
testing because they opt for private schools or reside in well-rated elementary school zones, 
which are equally if not more well-regarded than gifted-and-talented programs. However, even 
when holding constant all student- and zone-level sociodemographic characteristics, I still find 
that Asian families are more likely to request testing and Black and Hispanic families are less 
likely to request testing than their White peers (p<0.001). However, the negative relationship 
between Black and Hispanic students and requesting testing is slightly reduced. ELLs, FRL 
eligible students, and SWDs continue to remain less likely to request testing (p<0.001). 
When I include student- by zone-level socioeconomic interaction terms in Model 3, I find 
that the negative relationship between FRL eligibility and likelihood to request testing is slightly 
alleviated and also find that the relationship between requesting testing and students’ FRL 
eligibility depends on the educational attainment and income of the zone they reside in 
(p<0.001). Specifically, I find that low-income children are more likely to request testing if they 
reside in zones with higher median incomes when keeping all else constant. Interestingly, I find 
that the detrimental relationship between FRL eligibility and requesting testing is exacerbated for 
students who reside in zones with a higher proportion of college graduates, with low-income 
children less likely to request testing if they reside in more educated areas. Families living in 
more educated zones might be less likely to engage because they more content with their default 
zoned elementary school option. Keeping all else equal, I continue to find that Asians have a 
greater likelihood to request testing than their White peers (8 percent, p<0.001), while Black and 
Hispanic students are even less likely to request testing than their White peers (5 and 6 percent 





All Students. Models 4, 5, and 6 indicate the relationship between requesting testing and 
student- and zone-level sociodemographic characteristics and socioeconomic interaction terms 
among all students (n=365,103). Overall, I find similar relationships between requesting testing 
and sociodemographic attributes as I did with students with student-level data. The only 
difference is that when I introduce socioeconomic interactions in Model 6, taking into account all 
else, I find that although FRL eligible students remain less likely to request testing (p<0.001), the 
magnitude of this relationship has diminished. Among all students, FRL eligible students are 
now only 5 percent less likely to request testing than their non-FRL peers, while in comparison 
among students with student-level data, FRL eligible students are nearly 10 percent less likely to 
request testing. 
Broadly, these analyses suggest that child and community background play an important 
role in determining whether families engage with the gifted-and-talented process from the start. 
It is important to consider that my sample only includes families who engage with the NYCDOE 
at some point (e.g., gifted-and-talented admissions, kindergarten admissions, pre-kindergarten 
enrollment, and kindergarten enrollment) and excludes families who never participate in any of 
the NYCDOE admissions processes and enroll their children in private schools, which are 
predominantly White, wealthier families. Therefore, my findings may be somewhat conservative 
compared to analyses that involved the full population of eligible families with young children. 
Nonetheless, generally I find that how families navigate the bureaucracy and bureaucratic rules 
varies by student-level and zone-level sociodemographic characteristics. Unlike their wealthier, 
Asian peers, low-income, Black, and Hispanic children are less likely to request testing than their 
higher-income, White peers, and while those living in more educated elementary school zones 










Table 4.2. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 
Socioeconomic Interactions, and Requesting Testing. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Student-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Missing student-level data 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
Female 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
Race/ethnicity
Asian 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
Black -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04***
Hispanic -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05***
Other -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
English Language Learners -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11***
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.05***
Students with Disabilities -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09***
Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity
% Asian (10s of %s) 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01*
% Black (10s of %s) 0.01* 0.00 0.01* 0.00
% Hispanic (10s of %s) 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01*
% Other (10s of %s) -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04***
% United States citizen (10s of %s) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 0.01~
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05***
Median income ($10,000s)1 -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01**
Socioeconomic Interactions
FRL by % Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) -0.01*** -0.01***
FRL by Median income ($10,000s) 0.01*** 0.01***
Constant 0.31*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.30*** 0.18*** 0.19***
R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.17
Change in R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
~p <0.1; *p <0.05; **p <0.01; p <0.001***; 1Centered







Who Tests?: Descriptive Results 
Step two in the gifted-and-talented admissions process is testing. While nearly 68,000 
families request testing over the four-year period, over 15 percent of them do not actually show 
up to the test. Table 4.3 shows the associations between testing and sociodemographic 
characteristics. In this descriptive analysis, I distinguish families who request testing and test, 
those who request testing but do not test, and those who do not request testing.  
Students with Student-Level Data. Among the subset of children who enroll in a 
NYCDOE school for pre-K and/or kindergarten (n=338,694; all differences p<0.001), my results 
suggest there are differences between requesting testing and testing by child sociodemographic 
characteristics (Figure 4.4). I find that requesting testing and testing varies by child 
race/ethnicity. While most families do not request testing, more Asian and White children test 
than Black and Hispanic children. Among both Asians and Whites, about one-quarter test and 
nearly three-quarters do not request testing. Even more contrastingly, among Blacks, less than 10 
percent test and about 90 percent do not request testing, and among Hispanics, only 6 percent test 
and over 90 percent do not request testing. Across all race/ethnicity groups, only 2 to 3 percent 
request testing but do not test. I also find associations between English proficiency, FRL 
eligibility, disability status, and requesting testing and testing patterns. Of FRL eligible students, 






Figure 4.4. Among Students with Student-Level Data, Requesting Testing and Testing by Student 
Sociodemographic Characteristics 
 
I also find that requesting testing and testing varies by neighborhood characteristics 
(Figure 4.5). On average, children who test reside in neighborhoods that have more Asian (5 
percent) and White (10 percent) residents and less Black (3 percent) and Hispanic (7 percent) 
residents than the neighborhoods of their peers who request testing but do not test (p<0.001). 
Contrastingly, children who do not request testing reside in neighborhoods with slightly less 
White and slightly more Hispanic residents than the neighborhoods of their peers who request 
testing but do not test (p<0.001). In terms of neighborhood socioeconomic backgrounds, students 
who proceed further along in the admissions process reside in neighborhoods with more 







































% Female % Asian % Black % Hispanic % Other % White % ELL % FRL % SWD





Figure 4.5. Among Students with Student-Level Data, Requesting Testing and Testing by Neighborhood 
Sociodemographic Characteristics 
 
All Students. Among all students (n=365,103), I find similar differences in requesting 
testing and testing by neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics to those I found for the 
subset of students with student-level data (Figure 4.6). Distinctions are primarily between 
families who request testing but do not test and families who do not request testing. Among all 
students, I find that students who request testing but do not test reside in neighborhoods that are 
proportionately even more educated and more wealthy than their counterparts who do not request 
testing (p<0.001). These differences between students with student-level data and all students 
align with my findings in Who Requests Testing?: Descriptive Results that more White, 
educated, and wealthy families participate in NYCDOE admissions processes but do not enroll 
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Figure 4.6. Among All Students, Requesting Testing and Testing by Neighborhood Sociodemographic 
Characteristics 
 
As with requesting testing, my descriptive results suggest that more Asian and White 
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(n=286,02 (n=8,201) (n=44,469) (n=297,15 (n=11,114 (n=56,830)
Student Sociodemographic Characteristics
% Female*** 48.00 51.91 52.12
Race/ethnicity
% Asian*** 14.00 16.36 28.66
% Black*** 24.84 27.91 17.29
% Hispanic*** 43.63 32.52 19.40
% Other*** 2.51 3.68 4.80
% White*** 15.02 19.52 29.85
% English Language Learners*** 22.22 8.12 8.00
% Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible*** 76.20 61.60 43.70
% Students with Disabilities*** 17.70 8.66 6.44
Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity, mean (SD )
% Asian 13.70 13.89 18.97*** 13.73 13.74 18.19***
17.89 17.17 19.49 17.86 16.54 18.86
% Black, non-Hispanic 24.97 25.01 17.19*** 24.70*** 23.15 16.64***
26.90 27.83 25.37 26.82 27.25 24.94
% Hispanic 36.18*** 31.12 23.89*** 35.93*** 28.95 22.89***
25.08 23.15 20.33 25.10 22.87 19.96
% Other 2.73 2.81 2.85 2.73*** 2.88 2.86
3.74 3.55 3.18 3.72 3.44 3.06
% White, non-Hispanic 22.42*** 27.16 37.10*** 22.91*** 31.27 39.42***
25.95 28.63 28.63 26.27 28.96 29.07
% United States citizen, mean (SD ) 81.27*** 83.13 83.34 81.32*** 83.64 83.77
10.35 9.47 9.93 10.35 9.30 9.71
% Limited English-speaking household, mean (SD ) 18.34*** 15.80 16.37** 18.25*** 14.76 15.40***
13.73 12.46 13.92 13.76 12.45 13.78
Educational attainment of 25 years and over, mean (SD )
% Less than a high school diploma 24.49*** 20.91 17.62*** 24.31*** 19.28 16.63***
12.95 11.86 12.00 13.06 12.32 12.13
% High school diploma or equivalency 26.79*** 25.72 23.17*** 26.61*** 23.88 21.94***
8.54 9.00 9.78 8.69 10.12 10.35
% Some college or Associate’s degree 21.64 21.78 20.19*** 21.54*** 20.74 19.48***
6.37 6.46 6.89 6.43 7.03 7.16
% Bachelor’s degree or higher 27.09*** 31.59 39.02*** 27.55*** 36.10 41.94***
17.84 19.22 21.42 18.37 22.74 23.13
Median income, mean (SD) 50,971*** 55,902      65,749*** 51,612*** 61,888      69,445***
26,893      28,209      31,281      27,747      34,232      34,427      
~p <0.10;*p <0.05; **p <0.01; p <0.001***






Who Tests?: Analytic Results 
Using a multi-level model, I estimate the probability that children take the gifted-and-
talented test (Table 4.4). I ran models for students with student-level data and all students but 
found few differences, so moving forward, my analytic results only include models of students 
with student-level data.  
Students with Student-Level Data. In Model 1, I present the relationship between testing 
and student-level sociodemographic characteristics among a subset of children with student-level 
data (n=67,944). Adjusting for all other child characteristics, my results suggest that compared to 
their White peers, Asian students are slightly more likely to test (p<0.001), while Black and 
Hispanic students are less likely—7 and 8 percent respectively—to test. As with requesting 
testing, I also continue to find a negative association between FRL eligibility and testing, where 
FRL eligible students are on average 6 percent less likely to test than their non-FRL eligible 
counterparts (p<0.001).  
 Some of the relationships between testing and student attributes are partially explained by 
the characteristics of students’ elementary school zones. In Model 2, I account for zone-level 
sociodemographic characteristics. Controlling for all else, children residing in zones with higher 
proportions of Hispanic residents are slightly less likely to test (p<0.001). I also find that a 10 
percent increase in the proportion of college graduates predicts a 1 percent increase in the 
probability of testing (p<0.05), while each $10,000 increase in median zone income is associated 
with a 0.3 percent increase in the probability of testing (p<0.10), holding all else constant. 
However, even when keeping all other student- and zone-level sociodemographic characteristics 
equal, I still find that Asians are more likely to test and Blacks and Hispanics are less likely to 





and their White peers are slightly reduced. My results continue to suggest that FRL eligible 
students are less likely to test than their non-eligible counterparts (p<0.001).  
Further adjusting for student- by zone-level socioeconomic interactions in Model 3, the 
negative relationship between FRL eligibility and testing is even stronger, with FRL eligible 
students now 10 percent less likely to test than their non-FRL eligible peers (p<0.001). I find that 
although zone median income does not predict testing for students who do not qualify for FRL, 
for FRL eligible students, zone median income does predict testing (p<0.001). As income 
decreases, the negative effect of being FRL eligible worsens; a $10,000 decrease in median 
income predicts a 1 percent decrease in the probability of testing for FRL eligible students. 
Taking into account all student- and zone-level characteristics and interactions, while I continue 
to find that a 10 percent increase in the proportion of college graduates predicts a 1 percent 
increase in the probability of testing (p<0.001), I no longer find a relationship between zone 
median income and testing (p>0.05). However, my results continue to suggest that Asians have a 
slightly stronger likelihood to test than their White peers (3 percent, p<0.001) and that Black and 
Hispanic students are less likely to test than their White peers (p<0.001). 
Generally, my results for testing are consistent with my results for requesting testing and 
reveal that families’ ability to navigate the bureaucratic system varies by sociodemographic 
characteristics. While Asian children are more likely to take the test than their White peers, 
Black and Hispanic children and children from low-income families are less likely to test than 
their White, higher-income peers. Furthermore, while students living in more educated 
elementary school zones are slightly more likely to test, living in wealthier zones only changes 





Table 4.4. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 
Socioeconomic Interactions, and Testing. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Student-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Female 0.00 0.00 0.00
Race/ethnicity
Asian 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
Black -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.06***
Hispanic -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07***
Other -0.01 0.00 0.00
English Language Learners -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02***
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.10***
Students with Disabilities -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity
% Asian (10s of %s) 0.00 0.00
% Black (10s of %s) 0.00 0.00
% Hispanic (10s of %s) -0.01*** -0.01***
% Other (10s of %s) -0.01 -0.01
% United States citizen (10s of %s) -0.01 -0.01
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) 0.02*** 0.02***
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) 0.01* 0.01**
Median income ($10,000s)1 0.01* 0.00
Socioeconomic Interactions
FRL by % Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) 0.00
FRL by Median income ($10,000s) 0.01***
Constant 0.89*** 0.92*** 0.91***
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04
Change in R-squared 0.01 0.00








Who Applies?: Descriptive Results 
The next step that families engage in is applying. Table 4.5 shows the associations 
between applying and sociodemographic attributes. I first look at application patterns among 
children who score 97 or above and are eligible to apply to both district and city programs. I then 
look at applications among children who score between 90 and 96 points and are only eligible to 
apply to district programs. 
City Eligible – Students with Student-Level Data. Among city eligible students with 
student-level data (n=5,716), my results suggest there is an association between applying and 
student-level sociodemographic characteristics (Figures 4.7). Although I find no difference in 
applications by students’ FRL eligibility (p>0.05), I find an association between applying and 
student race/ethnicity (Figure 4.7). Of city eligible students who apply, nearly 80 percent are 
White (p<0.05) or Asian (p<0.01) and less than 15 percent are Black (p<0.001) or Hispanic 
(p<0.01). In contrast, of city eligible students who do not apply, 65 percent are White or Asian, 
and about 30 percent are Black or Hispanic. Proportionally far more White and Asian candidates 







Figure 4.7. Among City Eligible Students with Student-Level Data, Applications by Student Sociodemographic 
Characteristics 
 
My results also suggest that there are differences in applying by neighborhood 
sociodemographic characteristics (Figure 4.8). Among city eligible students, those who apply 
reside in zones that are slightly more Asian (p<0.05) and White (p<0.01) and slightly less 
Hispanic (p<0.10) than the zones of their peers who do not apply (Figure 4.8). Overall, students 
who apply also reside in zones that are slightly more educated than those who do not apply, 
where applicants reside in zones composed of about 5 percentage points more individuals 
holding a bachelor’s degree than their non-applicant peers (p<0.001). I also find that families 
who apply reside in zones with a higher median income—about $5,400 or 7 percentage points 


































Figure 4.8. Among City Eligible Students with Student-Level Data, Applications by Neighborhood 
Sociodemographic Characteristics 
  
City Eligible – All Students. Among all city eligible students (n= 6,574), I find similar 
differences in applying by neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics as I did for the subset 
of students with student-level data (Figure 4.9). I continue to find that students who apply reside 
in zones that have slightly more Asians (p<0.001) and slightly less Black residents (p<0.05) than 
the zones of their peers who do not apply (Figure 4.9). Interestingly, although among students 
with student-level data, I found that that applicants reside in more educated and more wealthy 
zones than non-applicants, among all students, I find that applicants reside in slightly less 
educated and less wealthy zones than their non-applicant peers (p<0.01). These differences in 
zone socioeconomic attributes between students with student-level data and all students confirm 
my earlier findings that educated and wealthy families participate in NYCDOE admissions 















































Figure 4.9. Among All City Eligible Students, Applications by Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics 
  
District Eligible – Students with Student-Level Data. Among district only eligible 
students with student-level data (n=8,912), my results suggest there is an association between 
applying and students’ sociodemographic characteristics (Figure 4.10). I now find a difference in 
applications by students’ FRL eligibility, with a slightly greater percentage of FRL eligible 
students applying to district programs (p<0.01, Figure 4.10). Compared to city eligible students 
with student-level data, among district eligible students the difference between the percentage of 
Asians who apply versus their peers who do not is even wider with 14 percentage points more 
applicants (p<0.001) and the difference between the percentage of Blacks who apply versus their 
peers who do not is more narrow with only 2 percent points fewer applicants (p<0.10). 
Interestingly, although I found that slightly more White city eligible candidates apply than do not 
(p<0.05), among district eligible students, I find that less White candidates apply (p<0.001). This 
suggests that White families are more interested in applying to city gifted-and-talented programs 
















































Figure 4.10. Among District Eligible Students with Student-Level Data, Applications by Student 
Sociodemographic Characteristics 
 
Among district eligible students, my results also suggest that there are differences in 
applying by sociodemographic characteristics (Figure 4.11). Also noteworthy, while among city 
eligible students, those who apply live in zones that are more White (p<0.01), more educated 
(p<0.001), and more wealthy (p<005), among district eligible students, those who apply live in 
zones that are slightly less White (p<0.01) and less educated (p<0.01), and I no longer find a 
relationship between median income and applying (p>0.05). Applicants reside in zones 
composed of about 2 percentage points less White residents and individuals holding a bachelor’s 





































Figure 4.11. Among District Eligible Students with Student-Level Data, Applications by Neighborhood 
Sociodemographic Characteristics 
 
District Only Eligible – All Students. As with district eligible students with student-level 
data, among all district eligible students (n= 10,616), I find similar relationships between the 
zone sociodemographic characteristics of students who apply versus their counterparts who do 
not apply. The one difference is that I now find that families who apply reside in zones with 
median incomes about $12,600 or 14 percentage points less than their counterparts who do not 
apply (p<0.001). This aligns with my previous findings that wealthy families participate in 
NYCDOE admissions processes but do not enroll their children in NYCDOE schools. 
As with testing, among city eligible students, more Asian, White, and higher 
socioeconomic status families apply to gifted-and-talented programs. However, among district 
eligible students, I find that applicants are slightly less White, less educated, and of lower income 
than their non-applicant peers. While eligible White, educated, and wealthy families are 
interested in applying to city gifted-and-talented programs, they but do not hold the same interest 
























































(n=287) (n=5,429) (n=561) (n=6,013) (n=1,184) (n=7,728) (n=2,198) (n=8,418)
Student Sociodemographic Characteristics
Female 0.51 0.51 0.53~ 0.50
Race/ethnicity 
Asian 0.25** 0.33 0.23*** 0.36
Black 0.14*** 0.06 0.10~ 0.08
Hispanic 0.13** 0.08 0.16*** 0.12
Other 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06
White 0.40* 0.46 0.44*** 0.37
English Language Learners 0.03** 0.08 0.04** 0.06
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible 0.26 0.22 0.25* 0.29
Students with Disabilities 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity 
% Asian 17.43* 19.82 16.09*** 19.38 16.06*** 21.97 15.22*** 21.47
% Black, non-Hispanic 14.36 8.95 10.62* 8.90 12.77** 10.74 10.81 10.64
% Hispanic 18.69~ 16.89 16.37 16.64 21.26* 19.98 17.81*** 19.67
% Other 2.96 2.81 3.00 2.83 3.16*** 2.82 3.14*** 2.83
% White, non-Hispanic 46.56** 51.53 53.92 52.26 46.74** 44.49 53.02*** 45.39
% United States citizen 85.07 84.65 85.80* 84.81 85.34*** 83.48 86.20*** 83.69
% Limited English-speaking household 14.62 15.55 11.92*** 15.01 14.02*** 16.05 11.40*** 15.61
Educational attainment of 25 years and over
% Less than a high school diploma 14.12~ 12.97 11.25** 12.58 14.44* 15.19 11.58*** 14.77
% High school diploma or equivalency 20.18*** 18.01 16.43* 17.50 19.48** 20.43 15.89*** 19.92
% Some college or Associate’s degree 18.54*** 16.99 16.16~ 16.68 18.16 18.38 15.86*** 18.11
% Bachelor’s degree or higher 47.15*** 52.03 56.16** 53.23 47.91** 46.00 56.66*** 47.20
Median income 74,264* 79,727      85,984** 81,429      75,314      74,305      88,331*** 75,721      
~p <0.1; *p <0.05; **p <0.01; p <0.001***
(n=5,716) (n=6,574) (n=8,912) (n=10,616)
City Eligible Only District Eligible 





Who Applies?: Analytic Results 
To unpack whether applying is linked to sociodemographic attributes, I employ a multi-
level model estimating the probability that a family applies to gifted-and-talented programs (see 
Table 4.6).  
Students with Student-Level Data. Model 1 indicates the relationship between applying 
and student-level sociodemographic characteristics among a subset of children with student-level 
data (n=16,253). Controlling for all else, compared to their White peers, parents of Asian 
children are slightly more likely to apply (p<0.001), but parents of Black and Hispanic children 
are slightly less likely—3 percent and 4 percent respectively—to apply (p<0.001). At the 
application stage, I no longer find a relationship between FRL eligibility and applying (p>0.05).  
In Model 2, I account for zone-level sociodemographic characteristics. Holding constant 
all other characteristics, children residing in zones with higher proportions of Hispanic residents 
are slightly less likely to apply (p<0.10). However, I find no relationships between the proportion 
of college graduates or median income and the probability of applying (p>0.05). However, even 
keeping all zone-level sociodemographic characteristics equal, I still find that Asian families are 
slightly more likely to apply (p<0.05) and Hispanic families are slightly less likely to apply than 
their White peers (p<0.01). However, I no longer find a relationship between Black families and 
their likelihood to apply (p>0.05).  
I ran another model based on the subset of students with student-level data where I 
further adjusted for student- by zone-level socioeconomic characteristics. However, when I 
introduce these new socioeconomic interactions, I find no change to the prior model for all 
student-and zone-level sociodemographic characteristics. I also find no relationship between 





(p>0.05). Therefore, I exclude the model in the interest of parsimony. 
In general, my results suggest that child race/ethnicity is associated with family decisions 
to apply to gifted-and-talented programs, with Asians being slightly more likely and Blacks and 
Hispanics being slightly less likely to apply than their White peers. However, bureaucratic 
decision rules appear to be less of a barrier at this stage of the admissions process as application 





Table 4.6. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 
Socioeconomic Interactions, and Applying. 
 








English Language Learners 0.04*** 0.03**
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible 0.00 0.00
Students with Disabilities -0.01 -0.01
Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity
% Asian (10s of %s) 0.01
% Black (10s of %s) 0.00
% Hispanic (10s of %s) -0.01~
% Other (10s of %s) -0.02
% United States citizen (10s of %s) -0.02~
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) -0.01
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) 0.00
Median income ($10,000s)1 0.00
Constant 0.90*** 1.07***
R-squared 0.01 0.01
Change in R-squared 0.00








Who Enrolls?: Descriptive Results 
The final step in the gifted-and-talented admissions process is enrollment—where 
families whose children have received an offer to a gifted-and-talented program ultimately end 
up enrolling their children for the kindergarten school year. I show the associations between 
enrolling in a NYCDOE school and sociodemographic characteristics among city eligible 
students in Table 4.7 and among district eligible students 4.8. In these descriptive analyses, I 
distinguish those who leave the district school system for private alternatives or for other school 
districts, those who enroll in a general education classroom at a NYCDOE district school, 
including charter schools, and those who enroll in a gifted-and-talented program.  
City – Students with Student-Level Data. Among the subset of city eligible students with 
student-level data who receive an offer (n=4,717), my results suggest that enrollment decisions 
vary by child sociodemographic characteristics (Figure 4.12). I find a relationship between 
enrollment choices and students’ race/ethnicity. Across all race/ethnicity groups around 5 percent 
or less of children who receive an offer to a gifted-and-talented program leave the NYCDOE 
school system for kindergarten. Among Asian students who receive an offer, the vast majority 
(87 percent) attend a gifted-and-talented program and about 10 percent attend a NYCDOE 
school (p<0.001). Among Black (p<0.001) and Hispanic (p<0.01) students with offers, over 70 
percent enroll in a gifted-and-talented program and over one-fifth enroll in a district school, and 
among White students with offers, over three-quarters enroll in gifted-and-talented programs and 
one-fifth enroll in district schools (p<0.001). Thus, in comparison to Asian families, more Black, 
Hispanic, and White families elect their default zoned district schools, which might be more 





FRL eligibility by enrollment decisions (p<0.001). Of FRL eligible students who receive an 
offer, nearly 85 percent attend a gifted-and-talented program, 15 percent attend a district school, 
and only one percent leave the system, which would be expected as low-income families have 
less flexibility and resources to leave the system for alternative options.  
Figure 4.12. Among City Eligible Students with Student-Level Data Who Received an Offer, Enrollment by 
Student Sociodemographic Characteristics 
 
My results also suggest that enrollment decisions vary by neighborhood 
sociodemographic characteristics (Figure 4.13). While I find no differences in enrollment 
patterns between students who leave the NYCDOE school system and their peers who enroll in 
district schools by any of the neighborhood sociodemographic attributes (p>0.05), I do, however, 
find differences in enrollment patterns between students who enroll in gifted-and-talented 
programs and their peers who enroll in district schools. Children who enroll in gifted-and-
talented programs reside in neighborhoods that are somewhat more Asian (p<0.001) and slightly 
less Black (p<0.001) and White (p<0.01) than the neighborhoods of their peers who enroll in 
district schools. Compared to their peers who enroll in district schools, children who enroll in 
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individuals with lower median incomes (p<0.001). 
Figure 4.13. Among City Eligible Students with Student-Level Data Who Received an Offer, Enrollment by 
Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics 
 
City – All Students. Among all city eligible students who receive an offer (n=5,084), I 
now find a difference in enrollment by neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics between 
those who leaven the NYCDOE school system and those who enroll in district schools (Figure 
4.14). Among all students, I find that students who leave the system reside in neighborhoods that 
are proportionately more educated (p<0.001) and more wealthy (p<0.001) than their counterparts 
who enroll in district schools. These differences suggest that regardless of living in 
neighborhoods with more educated and wealthier residents and likely having access to better 
zoned elementary school options, some families with the financial means and resources 
participate in the admissions processes but still select alternative private schools or school. 
Among children who were eligible for city programs who received an offer, most 
families enroll their child in gifted-and-talented programs. However, while only one-tenth of 
Asian children attend their default zoned school, as many as one-fifth of Black, Hispanic, and 























































program. Furthermore, enrollment decisions are closely linked to families’ default elementary 
school options. Children living in neighborhoods with more educated and wealthier residents 
enroll in their district schools, which likely reflects the higher quality of their default elementary 
zoned school. This coincides with earlier evidence presented by Mader et al. (2018) who found 
that families residing in more wealthy areas were more content with their zoned schools and 


















(n=146) (n=782) (n=3,789) (n=513) (n=782) (n=3,789)
Student Sociodemographic Characteristics
Female 55.48 51.79 50.30
Race/ethnicity
% Asian*** 28.77 20.72 37.13
% Black*** 11.64 7.54 5.04
% Hispanic** 9.59 11.51 7.60
% Other 5.48 6.39 7.63
% White*** 44.52 53.84 42.60
% English Language Learners*** 0.00 6.52 8.81
% Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible*** 10.27 20.84 24.02
% Students with Disabilities 4.11 5.75 4.14
Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity, mean (SD )
% Asian 15.98 14.58 21.89*** 15.71 14.58 21.89***
(14.00) (13.27) (19.68) (14.47) (13.27) (19.68)
% Black, non-Hispanic 12.43 11.59 8.46*** 9.62 11.59 8.46***
(19.85) (19.39) (16.59) (17.28) (19.39) (16.59)
% Hispanic 18.94 17.32 17.28 16.06 17.32 17.28
(17.64) (16.74) (14.87) (14.49) (16.74) (14.87)
% Other 3.28 3.03 2.75* 3.03 3.03 2.75*
(2.51) (2.55) (2.51) (2.71) (2.55) (2.51)
% White, non-Hispanic 49.36 53.48 49.62** 55.58 53.48 49.62**
(27.00) (26.29) (26.36) (25.38) (26.29) (26.36)
% United States citizen, mean (SD ) 85.32 86.06 83.93*** 85.79 86.06 83.93***
(7.79) (7.67) (9.69) (7.86) (7.67) (9.69)
% Limited English-speaking household, mean (SD ) 14.06 12.80 16.60*** 11.49 12.80 16.60***
(12.36) (13.02) (14.94) (12.32) (13.02) (14.94)
Educational attainment of 25 years and over, mean (SD )
% Less than a high school diploma 11.84 12.01 13.67** 10.16* 12.01 13.67**
(9.20) (11.06) (11.35) (10.15) (11.06) (11.35)
% High school diploma or equivalency 18.18 16.70 18.85*** 14.94** 16.70 18.85***
(10.41) (10.30) (9.98) (10.21) (10.30) (9.98)
% Some college or Associate’s degree 17.32 16.25 17.53*** 15.28* 16.25 17.53***
(6.69) (6.77) (6.66) (6.65) (6.77) (6.66)
% Bachelor’s degree or higher 52.66 55.04 49.94*** 59.61** 55.04 49.94***
(22.50) (23.93) (22.31) (23.08) (23.93) (22.31)
Median income, mean (SD ) 78,322 83,060 77,128*** 90,233** 83,060 77,128***
(37,257) (40,850) (34,785) (41,505) (40,850) (34,785)
~p <0.1; *p <0.05; **p <0.01; p <0.001***






District – Students with Student-Level Data. Among the subset of district eligible 
students with student-level data who receive an offer (n=5,094), my results suggest that 
enrollment decisions vary by child sociodemographic characteristics (Figure 4.14). I find similar 
relationships between enrollment choices neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics as I 
did with city eligible students. Among Asian students who receive an offer, over three-quarters 
attend a gifted-and-talented program and one-fifth attend a NYCDOE school (p<0.001). Among 
Black, Hispanic, and White students with offers, about 60 percent enroll in a gifted-and-talented 
program and one-third enroll in a district school (p<0.01). Thus, as was the case with offers to 
city programs, in comparison to Asian families, more Black, Hispanic, and White families elect 
their default zoned schools over their offers to district programs. I also find a difference in FRL 
eligibility by enrollment decisions (p<0.001). Of FRL eligible students who receive an offer to 
district programs, nearly three-quarters attend a gifted-and-talented program, one-quarter attend a 
district school, and a small minority leave the system. Therefore, as with offers made to city 
eligible students, I find that among offers made to district eligible students proportionately more 
Asian and low-income families select their gifted-and-talented offer than do Black, Hispanic, and 
White families. However, across all groups, somewhat more families select their default zoned 
school over their district gifted-and-talented offer than they do over their city offer, which speaks 






Figure 4.14. Among District Eligible Students with Student-Level Data Who Received an Offer, Enrollment by 
Student Sociodemographic Characteristics 
  
I continue to find that enrollment decisions vary by neighborhood characteristics (Figure 
4.15). Similar to city eligible students, compared to their peers who enroll in district schools, 
children who enroll in gifted-and-talented programs reside in neighborhoods composed of more 
Asians, less Hispanics and Whites, and slightly less educated individuals with lower median 
incomes (p<0.001). However, among district eligible students, I now find a relationship between 
those who leave the system and their peers who enroll district schools. Students who leave the 
system reside in neighborhoods that are slightly more Hispanic (p<0.01), less educated 
(p<0.001), and have lower median incomes (p<0.001) than the neighborhoods of their peers who 
remain in district schools.  These children may reflect families who live in transient, immigrant 
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Figure 4.15. Among District Eligible Students with Student-Level Data Who Received an Offer, Enrollment by 
Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics 
  
District – All Students. Among all district eligible students who receive an offer 
(n=5,410), I find no difference in the neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics between 
students who leave the district school system and their peers who enroll in a district school 
(p>0.05). Furthermore, the relationship between those who enroll in a gifted-and-talented 
program and their peers who enroll in a district school for all zone-level sociodemographic 
attributes remain exactly the same as they are among students with student-level data in the prior 
section. This is because these are the same students we have student level data for—all students 
enrolled in district schools and gifted-and-talented programs. 
In summary, my results suggest that family enrollment decisions vary for city and district 
programs. Among children who received an offer to a gifted-and-talented program, although 
most families enroll their child in gifted-and-talented programs, a greater proportion of district 
eligible children enroll in their zoned schools compared to their city eligible peers, which reflects 
the high reputation that city programs hold. Decisions to enroll a child in a gifted-and-talented 























































desirability of a family’s default zoned elementary school and by their ability to afford 
alternatives options outside the school system. Since families make decisions about where to 
enroll their children based on what their zoned elementary school, I suspect that those who 
remain at zoned schools reside in highly rated elementary school zones or live too far from the 
gifted-and-talented programs. There are only five city programs, which makes travelling to and 
from school a challenge for most families. Although there are far more district programs than 
there are city programs, gifted-and-talented programs are concentrated in the Whiter and higher 
income areas of the city. While most CSD’s across the city have one to three gifted-and-talented 
programs, CSD 2 has eight programs and CSD 20 has seven. Meanwhile, some of the poorest 
districts, such as CSD 7, 13, 16 and 23, do not offer any gifted-and-talented programs. Students 
residing in these districts are eligible for programs in neighboring districts, but this means the 
commute might be lengthy depending on the distance to schools. Therefore, families might elect 
to enroll their children in their zoned district school, which is much closer to home. Supporting 
this theory, Roda’s (2018) study of how parents engage with school choice found that while most 
immigrant families selected their zoned school because it was more convenient, wealthy, White, 
and Asian families chartered buses or vans that sometimes cost up to $3,000 per child per year so 
that their children could attend a particular gifted-and-talented program or charter school outside 






















(n=201) (n=1,445) (n=3,448) (n=517) (n=1,445) (n=3,448)
Student Sociodemographic Characteristics
Female 48.26 51.70 50.78
Race/ethnicity
% Asian*** 23.88 26.99 41.94
% Black** 13.93 12.66 9.63
% Hispanic** 19.90 14.88 12.62
% Other 5.97 5.88 4.79
% White*** 36.32 39.58 31.03
% English Language Learners** 0.00 6.30 5.48
% Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible*** 16.92 27.61 34.28
% Students with Disabilities 4.98 5.12 4.81
Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity, mean (SD )
% Asian 18.27 17.60 24.28*** 17.19 17.60 24.28***
(18.27) (18.08) (21.79) (17.48) (18.08) (21.79)
% Black, non-Hispanic 14.61 14.79 11.97*** 13.35 14.79 11.97***
(21.60) (23.15) (21.52) (21.08) (23.15) (21.52)
% Hispanic 26.11** 21.56 21.67 21.40 21.56 21.67
(22.21) (19.22) (17.98) (19.06) (19.22) (17.98)
% Other 2.51 2.90 2.72 2.74 2.90 2.72
(1.98) (2.28) (3.06) (1.95) (2.28) (3.06)
% White, non-Hispanic 38.51~ 43.15 39.36*** 45.32 43.15 39.36***
(28.70) (27.46) (27.34) (27.75) (27.46) (27.34)
% United States citizen, mean (SD ) 82.51* 84.57 82.38*** 84.25 84.57 82.38***
(9.89) (9.24) (10.86) (9.20) (9.24) (10.86)
% Limited English-speaking household, mean (SD ) 18.21** 14.01 17.90*** 14.50 14.01 17.90***
(15.54) (13.02) (14.86) (14.49) (13.02) (14.86)
Educational attainment of 25 years and over, mean (SD )
% Less than a high school diploma 16.59 14.74 17.26*** 13.70 14.74 17.26***
(11.50) (11.58) (11.91) (11.38) (11.58) (11.91)
% High school diploma or equivalency 22.89*** 19.34 23.54*** 19.19 19.34 23.54***
(9.51) (9.98) (9.45) (10.52) (9.98) (9.45)
% Some college or Associate’s degree 20.08** 18.39 19.96*** 18.18 18.39 19.96***
(6.43) (7.09) (6.65) (7.31) (7.09) (6.65)
% Bachelor’s degree or higher 40.44*** 47.53 39.24*** 48.94 47.53 39.24***
(20.92) (23.10) (19.86) (23.95) (23.10) (19.86)
Median income, mean (SD ) 65,108*** 74,880 67,465*** 76,127 74,880 67,465***
(30,750) (36,244) (28,354) (34,751) (36,244) (28,354)
~p <0.1; *p <0.05; **p <0.01; p <0.001***






Who Enrolls in Gifted & Talented Programs?: Analytic Results 
Using a multi-level model, I estimate the probability children who received an offer to 
either a district or city program enroll in and gifted-and-talented program in Table 4.9. To 
analyze enrollment, I only use all students data and exclude models of students with student-
level data. By definition, students with student-level data include children who enroll in a 
NYCDOE school for pre-kindergarten and/or, kindergarten. Since only a small subset (n=663) of 
these students enrolled for pre-kindergarten but did not enroll for kindergarten, looking at 
enrollment trends for the subset of students with student-level data is irrelevant. 
All Students. Model 1 indicates the relationship between enrollment in a gifted-and-
talented program and student-level sociodemographic characteristics among all students 
(n=10,118). Holding all other student characteristic constant, I find that Asian (p<0.001) and 
other race/ethnicity (p<0.01) students are more likely to enroll in a gifted-and-talented program 
than White students. However, I find that Black and Hispanic students are slightly less likely to 
enroll in gifted-and-talented programs (p<0.01). My results also suggest that FRL eligible 
students are slightly more likely to enroll (p<0.05). I also find that children who receive an offer 
to one of their first three choices are 17 percent more likely to enroll in a gifted-and-talented 
program (p<0.001). 
Some of these relationships are partially explained by the features of students’ elementary 
school zones. In Model 2, I introduce zone-level sociodemographic characteristics. Keeping all 
else equal, children in zones with higher proportions of Black (p<0.01) and Hispanic (p<0.001) 
residents are slightly less likely to enroll in gifted-and-talented programs. Similarly, students 
living in zones with more educated residents are also slightly less likely to accept their gifted-and 





probability of enrolling in gifted-and-talented programs (p>0.05). Taking into account additional 
zone-level variables, I continue to find similar relationships between enrolling and student-level 
sociodemographic attributes as I did in the prior model. 
I ran another model where I further adjusted for student- by zone-level socioeconomic 
characteristics. However, when I introduce these new socioeconomic interactions, I find no 
relationship between enrolling in a gifted-and-talented program and FRL eligibility by median 
zone income or by proportion of college graduates (p>0.05). Therefore, I exclude the model in 
the interest of parsimony.  
 Overall, while Asian, other race/ethnicity, and low-income students are slightly more 
likely to enroll in a gifted-and-talented program compared to their White, advantaged peers, 
Black and Hispanic students and those living in areas with more Black and Hispanic residents 
are slightly less likely to accept their offer. Although I might have expected Black and Hispanic 
students to be more likely to enroll in a gifted program, these results point to the neo-
institutionalism construct and the idea that environments play a critical role in understanding 
dynamics. As with studies that found that both White and historically marginalized students of 
color preferred schools where their children were less likely to be racially or socioeconomically 
isolated (Henig, 1990; Roda, 2015), despite having an offer to a gifted-and-talented program, 
Black and Hispanic families might be declining the offer to a gifted-and-talented program where 
they would likely be racially isolated given the overall underrepresentation of Black and 









Table 4.9. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 
Socioeconomic Interactions, and Enrolling in Gifted-and-Talented Programs. 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2
Student-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics







English Language Learners 0.01 0.00
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible 0.02* 0.02*
Students with Disabilities -0.01 -0.01
Top choice offer 0.17*** 0.16***
Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity
% Asian (10s of %s) 0.01
% Black (10s of %s) -0.02**
% Hispanic (10s of %s) -0.03***
% Other (10s of %s) -0.04
% United States citizen (10s of %s) -0.03
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) -0.03*
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) -0.04***
Median income ($10,000s)1 0.01
Constant 0.55*** 1.07***
R-squared 0.19 0.21
Change in R-squared 0.02







Who Enrolls in New York City District Schools?: Analytic Results 
Again, using a multi-level model, I estimate the probability children who received an 
offer to either a district or city program enroll in any NYCDOE district school including gifted-
and-talented programs and charter schools in Table 4.10. 
All Students. Model 1 indicates the relationship between enrollment in a NYCDOE 
school (excluding gifted-and-talented programs) and student-level sociodemographic 
characteristics among all students (n=10,118). Keeping all other student characteristic constant, I 
find that Asian and other race/ethnicity students are less likely to enroll in a gifted-and-talented 
program than White students (p<0.001). However, I find no difference in enrollment patterns 
between Black and Hispanic students and their White peers (p>0.05). My results also suggest 
that FRL eligible students are slightly more likely to enroll (p<0.001). I also find that children 
who receive an offer to one of their first three choices are 5 percent less likely to enroll in a 
NYCDEO school (p<0.001). 
However, some of these relationships are partially explained by the features of students’ 
elementary school zones. In Model 2, I introduce zone-level sociodemographic characteristics. 
Taking into account all student- and zone-level attributes, children in zones with higher 
proportions of Black (p<0.01) and Hispanic (p<0.001) residents are still slightly less likely to 
enroll in NYCDOE schools as they were with gifted-and-talented programs. Also, like 
enrollment in gifted programs, students living in zones with more educated residents are also 
slightly less likely to attend a NYCDOE school (p<0.001). However, I now find that students 
residing in zones with higher median incomes are slightly more likely to enroll in district schools 
(p<0.001). Even accounting for additional zone-level variables, I continue to find similar 





prior model.  
 In summary, the patterns for enrollment in district schools coincides with the patterns for 
enrollment in gifted-and-talented programs. Since more Asian and other race/ethnicity and 
students who receive an offer to one of their top choices accept their gifted-and-talented offer, 
less of these students enroll in district schools. However, low-income students are more likely to 
enroll in both gifted-and-talented programs and in district schools than their higher-income peers 
who likely opt for private schools or other district schools, which are options that low-income 
students cannot afford. Again, I find that my results underscore neo-institutionalism theories that 
families make enrollment decisions in open systems where environments shape how actors act 
and react to rules. Community background characteristics continue to shape family decisions. 
Children residing in elementary school zones with a higher proportion of Black and Hispanic 
residents are less likely to enroll in a district school, but children residing in zones with higher 
median income are slightly more likely to enroll in a district school, which may be more 






Table 4.10. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 




Model 1 Model 2
Student-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics







English Language Learners 0.03* 0.02
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible 0.03*** 0.02*
Students with Disabilities 0.02 0.02
Top choice offer -0.05*** -0.06***
Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity
% Asian (10s of %s) 0.00
% Black (10s of %s) -0.01*
% Hispanic (10s of %s) -0.01***
% Other (10s of %s) 0.00
% United States citizen (10s of %s) 0.01
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) 0.00
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) -0.04***
Median income ($10,000s)1 0.01***
Constant 0.95*** 1.06***
R-squared 0.02 0.05
Change in R-squared 0.03








When examined together, these models reveal many important findings about the 
relationship between family decisions and diversity in the gifted-and-talented admissions 
process. The findings from my primary analytic models suggest that how families navigate the 
bureaucratic system and admissions process and the diversity of families engaging in the process 
varies at each stage. First, at the requesting testing stage, Asians and families residing in more 
educated areas are more likely to request testing than their White peers and families residing in 
less educated areas. However, Blacks, Hispanics, and low-income families, and those residing in 
more wealthy areas are less likely to request testing than their White, higher-income peers and 
those residing in less wealthy areas. Accounting for socioeconomic interactions reduces the 
negative relationship between FRL eligibility and requesting testing, which is mediated by 
average educational attainment and median income of residents in the elementary school zone. 
While residing in a more educated zone alleviates the detrimental relationship between FRL 
eligibility and requesting testing, residing in a higher median income zone exacerbates the 
relationship. 
At the second stage, testing, I continue to find that Asians and those residing in more 
educated areas continue to be more likely to take the gifted-and-talented test than Whites and 
those residing in less educated areas. I also continue to find that Blacks, Hispanics, and low-
income students are less likely to take the test than their counterparts. However, for testing I no 
longer find a difference by zone median income. I also now find that the detrimental relationship 
between FRL eligibility and testing is alleviated for students who reside in zones with a higher 
proportion of college graduates or with higher median incomes.  





and rules at the application stage. Similar to the prior stages, at the stage of applying, Asians 
continue to be more likely to participate in the admissions process, while Blacks and Hispanics 
are less likely to apply than their White peers. However, family engagement in the application 
process does not vary by FRL eligibility or by residential education or wealth.  
Lastly, at the enrollment stage, my results differ for students who enroll in gifted-and-
talented programs and for those who enroll in a traditional NYCDOE school. I continue to find 
similar patterns by race/ethnicity, with Asians slightly more likely and Blacks and Hispanics 
slightly less likely to enroll in a gifted-and-talented program that their White peers. This aligns 
with earlier evidence that White and Asian families are more likely to leave their zoned schools 
to enroll in a gifted-and-talented program (Mader et al., 2018). As Henig (1990) and Roda (2015) 
found, the diversity of gifted-and-talented programs may be limited by family preferences for 
classrooms where they are racially represented rather than isolated. However, I now find that 
low-income students are more likely to enroll in a gifted-and-talented program than their peers 
who are of higher-income and can afford private school or other alternatives. As expected, my 
results also suggest that students who received an offer to one of their top three choices are more 
likely to enroll in a gifted-and-talented program than those who did not receive a top choice 
offer. As Roda (2015) reported, there is a hierarchy of gifted-and-talented programs, so when 
families do not receive an offer to their top choice, they then choose another option and retest for 
gifted-and-talented programs for first- and second-grade until they eventually get in.  
However, I find different patterns for enrolling in traditional NYCDOE schools. I find 
that low-income students and students who reside in higher income elementary school zones are 
more likely to enroll in district schools than their higher-income peers residing in less wealthy 





higher-income neighborhoods were less likely to exercise choice and instead, more likely to 
enroll in their default zoned school. Low-income students might be more likely to select their 
default zoned school because it is closer and more convenient and because they cannot afford to 
leave the system for private schools or other district schools. Students residing in wealthier areas 
may prefer district schools because they likely have access to more desirable, higher performing 
default zoned schools.  
At each stage in the process leading up to enrollment, I find fewer and fewer differences 
between sociodemographic groups. While a more diverse group of families request testing and 
test, as families progress further along in navigating the admissions process, the families at each 
stage look more and more similar to one another. However, the differences between groups 
accumulate and are wider at latter stages. This filtering nature of the admissions process leaves 
far lower proportions of low-income, Black, and Hispanic families enrolling in gifted-and-
talented programs than their higher-income, Asian and White peers. However, it is important to 
also recognize that enrollment decisions are shaped by a family’s default school and their ability 
to afford alternative options outside of NYCDOE schools.  
Ultimately, these results present a clear picture of which sociodemographic attributes are 
associated with how families navigate the admissions system and family engagement in the 
gifted-and-talented admissions process. However, it does not allow me to understand how 
bureaucratic admissions rules shape the admissions process and program. This work is essential 







Chapter 5. The Diversity of Gifted-and-Talented 
Admissions Criteria and Priorities 
 
The analyses in this chapter address my second set of research question as to whether 
gifted-and-talented admissions criteria and priorities advantage certain students. I focus on how 
two policies shape the diversity of gifted-and-talented admissions. First, the primary admissions 
criterion is a test score cut off. The cut off for district gifted-and-talented programs is 90 
percentage points and the cut off for city programs is 97 percentage points. Therefore, the 
question is whether the district-eligible and city-eligible pools of students are diverse. To what 
extent are test scores associated with student background? Second, in addition to test score cut 
offs, the gifted-and-talented admissions process also includes admissions preference rules that 
give certain students an advantage to a gifted-and-talented seat over others. The first priority rule 
is sibling priority, which is prioritizes entry for siblings of students currently enrolled in the 
school, whether it be in the gifted-and-talented program, general education program, dual 
language program, etc. As long as a student meets the test score criteria, he or she has immediate 
access to a seat at the same gifted-and-talented program as the enrolled sibling regardless of 
higher scoring students. To what extent does sibling priority influence the diversity of gifted-
and-talented programs? Does it advantage certain demographic groups?  
To address how the test score cutoff and sibling priority impact the diversity of gifted-
and-talented programs, I begin by analyzing how test scores vary by sociodemographic 
characteristics, how test score criteria shape diversity, how offers to district and city programs 
vary by sociodemographic characteristics, how the sibling preferences shape diversity, and how 








How Do Students Score?: Descriptive Results 
Test scores play a primary role in determining eligibility for district and city programs. 
Table 5.1 shows the associations between test scores and sociodemographic characteristics. In 
this descriptive analysis, I distinguish those who are ineligible (scores below a 90), those who are 
only eligible for district programs (scores 90 to 96), and those who are eligible for city programs 
(scores 97 or above).  
Students with Student-Level Data. Among students who took the test and who enrolled in 
a NYCDOE school for pre-kindergarten and/or kindergarten (n=44,469)—a subset of my sample 
for which I have student-level data—my results suggest there is an association between test 
scores and student-level sociodemographic characteristics (Figures 5.1). I find a relationship 
between test scores and students’ race/ethnicity (p<0.001), with more White and Asian scoring 
high enough to qualify for gifted-and-talented programs. Among Whites, one-fifth score in the 
97th percentile or above for city programs, one-quarter score between the 90th and 96th percentile 
for district programs, and 55 percent score below the 90th percentile. Similarly, among Asians, 
15 percent qualify for city programs, one-quarter for district programs, and about 60 percent do 
not qualify for any gifted-and-talented programs. However, in stark contrast, among Blacks, only 
5 percent are eligible for city programs, 10 percent for district programs, and over 85 percent are 
ineligible. Among Hispanics, just over 5 percent are eligible for city programs, 13 percent for 
district programs, and over 80 percent are ineligible for either. I also find a distinct association 
between FRL eligibility and test scores (p<0.001). Of FRL eligible students, the vast majority 





eligible for district programs and as few as 7 percent are eligible for city programs.  
Figure 5.1. Among Students with Student-Level Data, Test Scores by Student Sociodemographic Characteristics 
 
I also find that test scores vary by neighborhood characteristics (Figure 5.2). Children 
who are city eligible reside in neighborhoods that have more White residents and slightly less 
Asian, Black, and Hispanic residents than the zones of their peers who are district eligible 
(p<0.001). Contrastingly, children who ineligible for gifted-and-talented programs reside in 
zones that somewhat less White and slightly less Asian and somewhat more Black and Hispanic 
than the zones of their peers who are district eligible (p<0.001). In terms of neighborhood 
socioeconomic backgrounds, students who score higher reside in zones with more educated 
individuals (p<0.001) and with higher median incomes (p<0.001). On average, compared to their 
district eligible peers, children who are city eligible reside in zones composed of about 6 
percentage points more individuals holding a bachelor’s (p<0.001), while children who are 
ineligible reside in zones composed of about 12 percentage points less individuals holding 
bachelor’s degree (p<0.001). In comparison to their district eligible peers, zone median incomes 
are about $5,000 or 7 percentage points higher for children who are city eligible and as much as 
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Figure 5.2. Among Students with Student-Level Data, Test Scores by Neighborhood Sociodemographic 
Characteristics 
 
All Students. Among all city eligible students who took the test (n=56,830), I find similar 
differences in test scores by neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics to those I found for 
the subset of students with student-level data. 
Basically, the qualifying pool of candidates for gifted-and-talented programs are 
predominantly wealthy, White, and Asian children. Considerably more White students score high 
enough to be considered for city programs than any other race/ethnicity group, and only a small 
minority of low-income, Black, or Hispanic children qualify for city programs. Although there 
are slightly more low-income, Black, and Hispanic students who qualify for district programs, 
candidates qualifying for district programs are also predominantly White and then Asian 







































































(n=29,841) (n=8,912) (n=5,716) (n=39,640) (n=10,616 (n=6,574)
Student Sociodemographic Characteristics
% Female** 52.73 50.79 51.01
Race/ethnicity
% Asian*** 26.16 34.55 32.51
% Black*** 22.06 8.49 6.09
% Hispanic*** 23.44 12.89 8.43
% Other*** 3.98 5.94 7.33
% White*** 24.36 38.13 45.64
% English Language Learners*** 8.71 5.76 7.80
% Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible*** 52.45 28.16 22.25
% Students with Disabilities*** 7.23 4.93 4.69
Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity, mean (SD )
% Asian 18.17*** 21.19 19.70*** 17.50*** 20.18 19.10**
19.52 19.84 18.47 18.85 19.20 18.07
% Black, non-Hispanic 20.56*** 11.01 9.22*** 19.50*** 10.67 9.04***
27.32 19.93 17.59 26.73 19.39 17.22
% Hispanic 26.33*** 20.15 16.98*** 24.89*** 19.29 16.62***
21.46 17.59 15.16 21.02 17.15 14.80
% Other 2.85 2.86 2.82 2.86 2.89 2.84
3.42 2.72 2.52 3.25 2.63 2.47
% White, non-Hispanic 32.09*** 44.79 51.29*** 35.25*** 46.97 52.40***
27.99 27.26 26.51 28.92 27.31 26.30
% United States citizen, mean (SD ) 82.97*** 83.73 84.67*** 83.46*** 84.21 84.89***
10.04 9.97 9.12 9.82 9.68 8.97
% Limited English speaking household, mean (SD ) 16.71*** 15.78 15.50 15.68*** 14.74 14.75
13.67 14.31 14.53 13.59 14.09 14.34
Educational attainment of 25 years and over, mean (SD )
% Less than a high school diploma 19.25*** 15.09 13.02*** 17.99*** 14.11 12.47***
11.80 11.92 11.21 12.10 11.86 11.11
% High school diploma or equivalency 25.00*** 20.30 18.12*** 23.46*** 19.09 17.41***
8.99 10.23 10.18 9.93 10.49 10.27
% Some college or Associate’s degree 21.33*** 18.35 17.07*** 20.44*** 17.64 16.64***
6.61 6.90 6.74 7.03 7.04 6.77
% Bachelor’s degree or higher 34.41*** 46.25 51.78*** 38.10*** 49.16 53.48***
18.94 22.87 22.94 21.80 23.78 23.24
Median income, mean (SD ) 60,529*** 74,439 79,452*** 65,013*** 78,332 81,818***
27,497 34,420 37,025 31,989 37,066 38,186
~p <0.1; *p <0.05; **p <0.01; p <0.001***
(n=44,469)






How Do Students Score?: Analytic Results 
Exploring the association further, I use a multi-level model to predict children’s test 
scores in Table 5.2.  
Students with Student-Level Data. Model 1 indicates the relationship between test scores 
and student-level sociodemographic characteristics among students with student-level data 
(n=44,469). Accounting for all other student characteristic, compared to their White peers, Asian 
students score only about half a point higher (p<0.10), but Black and Hispanic students score 
lower—11 and 7 points respectively (p<0.001). Furthermore, FRL eligible students score 8 
points lower than their FRL ineligible counterparts (p<0.001).  
Some of these relationships are partially explained by students’ elementary school zone 
characteristics. In Model 2, further adjusting for elementary school zone-level sociodemographic 
characteristics, my results suggest that students residing in zones with higher proportions of 
Hispanic and other race/ethnicity residents score slightly lower (p<0.01). Controlling for all other 
variables, I also find that a 10 percent increase in the proportion of college graduates residing in 
the zone predicts a 2-percentile increase in test scores (p<0.001), but I find no relationship 
between zone-level median zone income and test scores (p>0.05). However, even when holding 
constant all student- and zone-level sociodemographic characteristics, I still find that Black, 
Hispanic, and low-income students score lower than their White, FRL ineligible peers (p<0.001).  
When I include student- by zone-level socioeconomic interaction terms in Model 3, I find 
that the negative relationship between FRL eligibility and test scores is slightly alleviated 
(p<0.001) and that the relationship between test scores and FRL eligibility depends on the 
average educational attainment (p<0.001) and income (p<0.05) of the zone students reside in. 





higher median incomes when keeping all else constant. Interestingly, I find that the detrimental 
relationship between FRL eligibility and test scores is exacerbated for students who reside in 
zones with a higher proportion of college graduates, with low-income children scoring slightly 
lower if they reside in more educated areas. Keeping all else equal, I continue to find that Black 
and Hispanic students score lower than their White peers (p<0.001).  
In general, my results suggest that while Asian student score slightly higher on the gifted-
and-talented test than their White peers, Black, Hispanic, and low-income students score lower 
than their White and higher-income peers. However, students residing in more educated 
elementary school zones score slightly higher, and as the proportion of college graduates residing 
in a zone increases, it can mediate the negative effect of being a low-income student. While test 
score cutoffs are an example of how bureaucratic decision rules can help organizations to run 
efficiently, the score cutoff is not effective in alleviating the lack of diversity in gifted programs. 
In fact, it might be possible that the origin of the test score criteria reflects systemic power since 






Table 5.2. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 
Socioeconomic Interactions, and Test Scores. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Student-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Female 0.52* 0.52* 0.52*
Race/ethnicity
Asian 0.58~ 0.67* 0.75*
Black -10.64*** -9.08*** -8.83***
Hispanic -7.09*** -6.01*** -5.81***
Other -0.16 0.10 0.13
ELL -6.03*** -6.03*** -6.00***
FRL -8.41*** -7.88*** -7.52***
SWD -5.81*** -5.89*** -5.81***
Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characterisitics
Race/ethnicity
% Asian (10s of %s) -0.06 -0.06
% Black (10s of %s) 0.18 0.12
% Hispanic (10s of %s) -0.42** -0.48**
% Other (10s of %s) -1.66** -1.94**
% United States citizen (10s of %s) -0.50 -0.33
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) 1.56*** 1.59***
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) 2.31*** 2.89***
Median income ($10,000s)1 0.08 -0.28*
Socioeconomic Interactions
FRL by % Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) -0.16***
FRL by Median income ($10,000s) 0.87***
Constant 77.81*** 71.94*** 70.72***
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
Change in R-squared 0.00 0.00







Diversity of Test Score Criteria 
In a process where Asian, White, and higher-income families disproportionately 
outnumber Black, Hispanic, and low-income families engaged at the requesting testing and 
testing stages, the test score cut off plays a pivotal role in determining the racial/ethnic and 
socioeconomic composition of eligible gifted-and-talented applicants. Figure 5.3 visually 
demonstrates the funneling nature of the test score cut off in the admissions process. Among 
students who enrolled in a NYCDOE school for pre-kindergarten and/or kindergarten—the 
subset of my sample for which I have student-level data, while the test score cut off is the stage 
of the most dramatic drop off in in the admissions process, the funneling effect is more dramatic 
for certain groups than others. I find that while a quarter of Asian, other race/ethnicity, and 
White students who take the test score between the 90th and 96th percentile, only 13 percent of 
low-income students and 10 percent of Black and Hispanic test takers score between the 90th and 
96th percentile, qualifying them for district programs. The drop off is even more dramatic for city 
eligibility. Though about 20 percent of other race/ethnicity and White students and 15 percent of 
Asian students who actually take the test score in the 97th percentile or higher, only 7 percent of 
low-income students and approximately 5 percent of Black and Hispanic test takers score in the 
97th percentile or higher, qualifying them for city programs. Overall, the test score criteria limit 
the percentage to Black, Hispanic, and low-income students from qualifying for district gifted-





































































































Free and Reduced-Price Lunch Eligible 
 
Note: Labeled percentages reflect the percent of the prior group. For example, 15 percent of Asians who tested 















































































Who Receives an Offer?: Descriptive Results  
Step five in the gifted-and-talented admissions process is receiving an offer. Table 5.3 
shows the associations between receiving an offer and sociodemographic characteristics. I first 
look at offers among applicants who are only eligible to apply for district programs. I then look 
at offers among applicants who are eligible to apply to both district and city programs.  
City – Students with Student-Level Data. Among city eligible applicants with student-
level data (n=5,429), my results suggest there are differences between receiving an offer by child 
sociodemographic characteristics (Figure 5.4). I find that receiving an offer varies by child 
race/ethnicity (p<0.001). Of city eligible students who receive an offer, 45 percent are White 
(p<0.001) and one-third are Asian (p<0.001). However, of city eligible students who do not 
receive an offer, as many as 55 percent are White and only one-quarter are Asian. I also find that 
while nearly a quarter of students who receive an offer are FRL eligible, only 15 percent of 
students who do not receive an offer are FRL eligible (p<0.001).  




























% Female % Asian % Black % Hispanic % Other % White % ELL % FRL % SWD





I also find that receiving an offer varies by neighborhood characteristics (Figure 5.5). 
Among city eligible students, children who receive an offer reside in elementary school zones 
that are slightly more Asian (p<0.001), Black (p<0.10), and Hispanic (p<0.001) and somewhat 
less White (p<0.001) than the zones of their peers who do not receive an offer. With respect to 
socioeconomic factors, on average, students who receive an offer reside in zones that are less 
educated than those who do not receive an offer; offer recipients reside in zones composed of 
about 9 percentage points less individuals holding a bachelor’s degree than their peers who do 
not receive an offer (p<0.001). Families who receive an offer also reside in zones with a lower 
median income than their counterparts who do not receive an offer (p<0.01). Zone median 
incomes are on average about $12,000 or 13 percentage points lower for those who receive an 
offer. 
Figure 5.5. Among City Eligible Applicants with Student-Level Data, Offers by Neighborhood Sociodemographic 
Characteristics 
 
City – All Students. Among all city eligible applicants (n=6,013), I find similar 
differences in receiving an offer by neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics to those I 















































District – Students with Student-Level Data. Among district eligible applicants with 
student-level data (n=7,728), my results suggest there are differences between receiving an offer 
by child sociodemographic characteristics (Figure 5.6). While I find no difference in receiving an 
offer between Asian and White students (p>0.05), I do find that receiving an offer varies by other 
race/ethnicity categories (p<0.001). Of district eligible students who receive an offer, 37 percent 
are Asian, 34 percent White, 14 percent Hispanic, and 11 percent Black. Of district eligible 
students who do not receive an offer, 35 percent are Asian, as many as 44 percent are White, 10 
percent Hispanic, and only 4 percent Black. Compared to city eligible applicants, I find that more 
district eligible applicants received an offer. Nearly one-third of students who receive an offer 
are FRL eligible, and one-quarter of students who do not receive an offer are FRL eligible 
(p<0.001).  
Figure 5.6. Among District Eligible Applicants with Student-Level Data, Offers by Student Sociodemographic 
Characteristics 
 
As with city eligible applicants, I also find that among district eligible applicants 
receiving an offer varies by neighborhood characteristics. Again, children who receive an offer 
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less White than the zones of their peers who do not receive an offer (p<0.001). With respect to 
socioeconomic factors, on average, students who receive an offer reside in zones that are slightly 
less educated and with a lower median income than those who do not receive an offer (p<0.001) 
District – All Students. Among all district eligible applicants (n=8,418), I find similar 
differences in receiving an offer by neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics to those I 
found for the subset of students with student-level data.  
Overall, while more Black, Hispanic, and low-income students receive offers to district 
programs than to city programs, offers remain reserved for more Asian and even more White 






















(n=712) (n=4,717) (n=929) (n=5,084) (n=2,634) (n=5,094) (n=3,008) (n=5,410)
Student Sociodemographic Characteristics
Female 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.51
Race/ethnicity 
Asian 0.25*** 0.34 0.35 0.37
Black 0.06 0.06 0.04*** 0.11
Hispanic 0.07 0.08 0.10*** 0.14
Other 0.07 0.07 0.07*** 0.05
White 0.55*** 0.45 0.44*** 0.34
English Language Learners 0.07 0.08 0.07** 0.05
Free or Reduced Price Lunch eligible 0.15*** 0.23 0.23*** 0.32
Students with Disabilities 0.06* 0.04 0.05 0.05
Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity 
% Asian 15.33*** 20.50 15.23*** 20.14 21.64 22.14 20.85* 21.82
% Black, non-Hispanic 7.93~ 9.10 8.01~ 9.06 6.61*** 12.88 6.64*** 12.86
% Hispanic 13.93*** 17.34 13.77*** 17.16 16.43*** 21.82 16.17*** 21.62
% Other 2.77 2.82 2.84 2.82 2.92* 2.76 2.93*** 2.77
% White, non-Hispanic 60.04*** 50.25 60.15*** 50.81 52.40*** 40.40 53.40*** 40.94
% United States citizen 86.76*** 84.33 86.77*** 84.45 84.40*** 83.00 84.68*** 83.14
% Limited English speaking household 13.31*** 15.89 12.34*** 15.50 14.58*** 16.81 13.94*** 16.54
Educational attainment of 25 years and over
% Less than a high school diploma 10.49*** 13.34 9.96*** 13.06 12.61*** 16.52 12.10*** 16.25
% High school diploma or equivalency 14.90*** 18.48 14.08*** 18.13 16.77*** 22.32 16.17*** 22.00
% Some college or Associate’s degree 14.90*** 17.31 14.39*** 17.10 16.18*** 19.52 15.85*** 19.37
% Bachelor’s degree or higher 59.70*** 50.87 61.57*** 51.70 54.43*** 41.64 55.87*** 42.38
Median income 90,182*** 78,148 92,737*** 79,363 8,3646*** 69,476 85,518*** 70,273
~p <0.1; *p <0.05; **p <0.01; p <0.001***
City Eligible Applicants District Eligible Applicants 
With Student-Level Data All Students With Student-Level Data All Students 





Who Receives an Offer?: Analytic Results 
To unpack these associations further, I constructed a multi-level model estimating the 
probability families would receive and offer to a district or city gifted-and-talented program (see 
Table 5.4).  
Students with Student-Level Data. In Model 1, I present the relationship between 
receiving an offer and student-level sociodemographic characteristics among students with 
student-level data (n=12,496). Accounting for all other student characteristic, compared to their 
White peers, Asian students are 2 percent more likely to receive an offer (p<0.05), Black 
students are 8 percent more likely (p<0.001), and other race/ethnicity students are 3 percent more 
likely (p<0.05). I find no difference in receiving an offer based on FRL eligibility (p>0.05).  
In Model 2, I introduce zone-level sociodemographic characteristics. On an adjusted 
basis, I find no difference in likelihood of receiving an offer based on the racial/ethnic proportion 
of families’ residential zones or on the median income of the zone (p>0.05). However, I do find 
that a 10 percent increase in the proportion of college graduates residing in the zone predicts a 5 
percent decrease in the probability of receiving an offer (p<0.001). However, even when holding 
constant zone-level sociodemographic characteristics, I still find that Asians and other 
race/ethnicity students are slightly more likely to receive an offer than their White peers 
(p<0.10). However, I no longer find a difference in the probability of receiving an offer between 
Black and White students (p>0.05).  
I ran another model where I further adjust for student- by zone-level socioeconomic 
interactions. However, as was the case with applying, when I introduce these new socioeconomic 
interactions, I find no change to the prior model for all student-and zone-level sociodemographic 





median zone income or by proportion of college graduates (p>0.05). Therefore, I exclude the 
model in the interest of parsimony. 
In summary, I find that Asian and other race/ethnicity students are slightly more likely to 
receive an offer to a gifted-and-talented program than their White peers. Further investigation is 
required to better understand why Asian and other race/ethnicity students are more likely to 
receive an offer. However, it may be that they listed more programs on their application or 
included programs that might be less desirable or have lower demand. In contrast to test scores, 






Table 5.4. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 
Socioeconomic Interactions, and Receiving an Offer. 
 
  













% Asian (10s of %s) -0.01
% Black (10s of %s) 0.00
% Hispanic (10s of %s) 0.00
% Other (10s of %s) 0.00
% United States citizen (10s of %s) 0.01
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) -0.02*
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) -0.05***
Median income ($10,000s)1 0.00
Constant 0.77*** 0.96***
R-squared 0.00 0.00
Change in R-squared 0.00







Diversity of Sibling Priority 
 While it is evident that, in general, receiving an offer varies by certain sociodemographic 
attributes, what the prior analysis does not capture is the role of admissions preferences, such as 
sibling priority, on the diversity of offers. Table 5.5 provides the students’ neighborhood 
sociodemographic characteristics across applicants with sibling priority and their peers without 
priority. The results suggest that families with sibling preferences live in neighborhoods with 
slightly higher proportions of Asian and White residents (p<0.01) and slightly lower proportions 
of Black and Hispanic residents (p<0.001) than their peers who do not have sibling preferences 
(p<0.01). While I find no difference in sibling priority by residential high school graduates or 
college graduates (p>0.05), I do find that students without sibling priority reside in 
neighborhoods with a greater proportion of individuals without a high school diploma (p<0.05). 
Lastly, I find that students with sibling priority reside in neighborhoods with slightly higher 
median incomes (p<0.10). Overall, my results suggest that more Asian, White, and wealthy 





Table 5.5. Sibling Priority and Students’ Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics. 
 
  
No Sibling Priority Sibling Priority
(n=2,977) (n=450)
Race/ethnicity 
% Asian 21.18** 24.42
% Black, non-Hispanic 9.68*** 5.29
% Hispanic 18.30*** 15.23
% White, non-Hispanic 48.00** 52.01
% Other 2.83~ 3.05
% United States citizen 83.77** 85.16
% Limited English speaking household 15.87 14.75
Educational attainment of 25 years and over
% Less than a high school diploma 13.98* 12.67
% High school diploma or equivalency 18.69 18.86
% Some college or Associate’s degree 17.40 17.41
% Bachelor’s degree or higher 49.92 51.05
Median income 77,867~ 81,142
~p <0.1; *p <0.05; **p <0.01; p <0.001***






Admissions Rules and Offers 
How do Admission Rules Influence Offers to Top Choice Programs?: Descriptive Results 
 
To better understand how both the admissions test score criteria and sibling priority rule 
are linked to who receives an offer, I look at offers made to families’ first choice gifted-and-
talented program by both test score and sibling priority.  
Offers to First-Choice and Top-Three-Choice City Programs. I begin with first choice 
offers to city gifted-and-talented programs as shown in Table 5.6 and Figure 5.8.  Of all students 
who receive an offer to their first-choice city program, 26 percent are students who have sibling 
priority, of which only 2 percent scored below the 99th percentile. However, of the remaining 74 
percent of students who received an offer without sibling priority, all but one scored in the 99th 
percentile. Therefore, sibling priority only advantaged 24 city applicants who scored below the 
99th percentile. Despite concerns that sibling preferences, as with legacy preferences, not only go 
against the ideals of merit and equity but also disproportionately benefit wealthy, White 
applicants, sibling preferences only advantaged a small proportion (~12 percent) of candidates.  
Table 5.6. Receiving Offers to First Choice City Gifted-and-Talented Program by Test Score and Sibling Priority. 
 
  
Percentile Ct. Pct. Ct. Pct.
99 30 3% 151 15%
98 13 1% 1 0%
97 11 1% 0 0%
Total 54 6% 152 16%





Figure 5.8. Receiving an Offer to First Choice City Gifted-and-Talented Program by Test score and Sibling Priority 
 
Offers to First-Choice and Top-Three-Choice District Programs. I also look at first choice 
offers to district gifted-and-talented programs as shown in Table 5.7 and Figure 5.9.  Of all 
students who receive an offer to their first-choice district program, 38 percent are students who 
have sibling priority. Of the remaining 62 percent of students received an offer without sibling 
priority, most scored in the highest percentiles—with 24 percent of first choice offers to students 
who score in the 97th percentile or above and another 12 percent of first choice offers to those wo 
score in the 96th percentile. While far less extreme than the case with offers to first choice city 
programs, where only one applicant who scored below the 99th percentile without sibling priority 
received a first-choice offer, among offers to first choice district program, only a quarter of 
applicants who scored in the 95th percentile or below without sibling priority received a first-
choice offer. Sibling priority advantaged over 200 district applicants who scored in the 95th 
percentile or below. Concerns of the advantage that sibling preferences provides families already 
well versed in the gifted-and-talented world are more relevant for offers made to district 











Offer to First Choice with Sibling Priority













Percentile Ct. Pct. Ct. Pct.
99 44 5% 106 11%
98 33 3% 76 8%
97 30 3% 50 5%
96 57 6% 118 12%
95 43 4% 64 7%
94 46 5% 59 6%
93 32 3% 47 5%
92 28 3% 44 5%
91 34 3% 25 3%
90 25 3% 14 1%
Total 372 38% 603 62%
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How do Admission Rules Influence Offers to Top Choice Programs?: Analytic Results 
Table 5.8 presents the associations between the various admissions criteria and priority 
rules and the likelihood of receiving an offer to a city and a district gifted-and-talented program.  
Offers to City Programs. For city gifted-and-talented programs, the admissions policies 
determining whether a student receives an offer are test score, demand (a ratio of applicants to 
seats), and sibling priority. Among city eligible applicants who scored in the 97th percentile or 
above, accounting for demand and sibling preferences, a 1 percentile increase in test score is 
associated with a 16 percent increase in the likelihood of receiving an offer to a child’s first 
choice program. However, for every 1 percent increase in demand, the likelihood of receiving an 
offer to the first-choice program is reduced by 3 percent, when adjusting for test scores and 
sibling priority. For context, the average first choice demand for the five city gifted-and-talented 
programs is about 3.3 applicants to seats. However, the demand varies by program, with The 
Anderson School in Manhattan having the highest demand at 6.6 applicants to seats and TAG for 
Young Scholars in Manhattan having the lowest at 0.5 applicants to seats. Holding test scores 
and demand constant, sibling priority gives a family an 82 percent advantage in the likelihood of 
receiving an offer to a family’s first choice city program.  
With respect to a family’s top three choices listed on the application, a 1 percentile 
increase in test score is associated with a 20 percent increase in the likelihood of receiving an 
offer to one of the top three programs selected. However, a 1 percent increase in demand is 
linked to a 2 percent decrease in the likelihood of receiving an offer to the first-choice program. 
Having an elder sibling currently enrolled at the school gives a family a 40 percent increase in 
the likelihood of receiving an offer to one of their top three listed choices. While test scores 





far less important role in determining offers to a top choice city program. Instead, sibling 
preferences give families a strong advantage in receiving an offer to a first-choice or top-three-
choice city gifted-and talented program.  
Offers to District Programs In addition to test score, demand, and sibling priority, for 
district gifted-and-talented programs, the admissions policies determining whether a student 
receives an offer also include district priority. Among district eligible applicants who scored in 
between the 90th and 96th percentile, taking into account test demand, sibling and district 
preferences, a 1 percentile increase in test score is associated with a 7 percent increase in the 
likelihood of receiving an offer to a family’s first choice program. For every 1 percent increase 
in demand, the likelihood of receiving an offer to the first-choice program is reduced by as much 
as 9 percent, holding all else constant. With over 75 different district program offerings, the 
average first choice demand for district programs is about 1.1 applicants to seats. However, the 
demand varies more widely for district programs, with highest demand being 5.2 at P.S. 77 
Lower Lab School, 3.4 at P.S. 144 Col Jeromus Remsen, and 2.9 at P.S./I.S. 229 Dyker and 
lowest demand reaching below 0.25 at several programs. Adjusting for test scores, demand, and 
district priority, sibling preferences gives a family a 63 percent advantage in the likelihood of 
receiving an offer to a family’s first choice district program. In comparison, district priority only 
increases the likelihood a family receives its first-choice district program by 36 percent.  
With respect to a family’s top three choices listed on the application, a 1 percentile 
increase in test score is associated with about a 10 percent increase in the likelihood of receiving 
an offer to one of the top three programs selected. However, a 1 percent increase in demand is 
linked to a 2 percent decrease in the likelihood of receiving an offer to the first-choice program. 





percent increase in the likelihood of receiving an offer to one of their top three listed choices, 
whereas district priority gives a family a nearly 50 percent increase in the likelihood of receiving 
an offer to one of their top three programs. Although somewhat less so than with city programs, 
sibling preferences give families a strong advantage in receiving an offer to a first-choice or top-
three-choice district gifted-and talented program. Although sibling priority plays a stronger role 
in determining an offer to a first-choice program, district priority plays a stronger role in 
determining an offer to one of the top three choices. Again, test score plays a far less important 
role in determining offers to a top choice district program. 
Table 5.8. The Associations Between Admissions Criteria and Priorities and Receiving an Offer to First Choice or 
Top 3 Choice. 
 
  
First Choice Top 3 Choice First Choice Top 3 Choice
Test score 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.07*** 0.11***
Demand at first choice -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.09*** -0.02***
Sibling priority to first choice 0.82*** 0.40*** 0.63*** 0.21***
District priority to first choice 0.36*** 0.48***
Constant -15.89*** -18.99*** -6.15*** -10.37***
R-squared 0.326 0.27 0.34 0.30
Change in R-squared -0.05 -0.05







The relationship between sociodemographic characteristics and test score and receiving 
an offer explain the overall lack of diversity in gifted-and-talented programs. The test score 
criteria play a critical role in shaping the racial/ethnic and socioeconomic composition of 
programs. In terms of performance on gifted-and-talented tests, Asians and those residing in 
more educated elementary school zones score higher on the gifted-and-talented test than Whites 
and families residing in less educated areas. However, Blacks, Hispanics, low-income families, 
and families residing in less wealthy zones score lower than White, higher-income peers, 
residing in wealthier zones. Furthermore, the funneling nature of test score cutoffs filters out 
low-income, Black, and Hispanic families from access to gifted-and-talented programs overall 
and particularly from access to city programs. Although one of the professed goals of 
implementing a standardized test and test score cutoffs was to encourage a meritocratic system 
and to increase diversity, my results suggest that test score cutoffs exacerbate the lack of 
diversity in gifted programs. It is important to consider that the very origins of the test score 
criteria may reflect the systemic power of the advantaged further benefitting from advantages.  
Unlike test scores, I do not find that admissions rules severely exacerbate the lack of 
diversity of students receiving an offer. I find that Asians and other race/ethnicity students are 
slightly more likely to receive an offer than their White peers. Interestingly, my results suggest 
that those residing in more educated areas are slightly less likely to receive an offer. This might 
be result from higher demand for gifted-and-talented programs by more educated families. 
However, I find no difference in the likelihood of receiving an offer by any of the other student- 
or zone-level sociodemographic attributes.  





Asians, Whites, and higher income families have the advantage of sibling priority. By 
advantaging Asian, White, and wealthy families who already have a child in a gifted-and-
talented program, sibling priority perpetuates a cycle of limiting the diversity of offers. However, 
exploring the intersection of test score criteria and sibling preferences reveals that the test score 
cutoffs, not sibling priorities, are the primary culprit of limiting the diversity of gifted-and-
talented programs. Sibling preferences only advantaged 24 of students who scored below the 99th 
percentile and still received an offer to their first-choice city program. Concerns of the advantage 
that sibling preferences allows are more relevant for offers made to district applicants. Among 
district applicants, anyone with sibling priority who scores in the 90th percentile or above 
immediately gets priority over those without sibling priority even if they score in the 99th 
percentile. Therefore, sibling priority gives these children an advantage over far more students. 
Furthermore, once a child meets the test score criteria for city and district programs, the score 
plays a far less important role in determining offers to a top choice program. Sibling preferences 
give families a strong advantage in receiving an offer to their first-choice city or district gifted-





Chapter 6. Conclusion  
 
The issue of the lack of diversity in gifted services has been underscored by the rising 
proportion of historically marginalized students of color and low-income students and the 
widening excellence gaps among different racial groups, high- and low-socioeconomic status, 
and different levels of English language proficiency. In response, in June 2017, the NYCDOE 
established a School Diversity Advisory Group (SDAG) made up of academics, students, 
parents, and advocates to make formal policy recommendations to the Mayor and Chancellor. 
Among recommendations to eliminate the use of competitive middle school “screens” and to 
institute a moratorium on new screened high schools, the SDAG also proposed phasing out 
gifted-and-talented programs and replacing them with enrichment models. However, the 
recommendations were met with strong opposition from some councilmembers protesting the 
idea (Knudson, 2019), elected officials and mayoral candidates counter proposing for expanding 
gifted-and-talented programming (Veiga, 2019; Witt, 2019), and others dismissing the 
recommendations as “an ideological campaign against educational excellence” (Hess, 2019). 
Given the strong backlash to the SDAG recommendations, it remains unclear what next steps the 
NYCDOE will take to address the lack of diversity in gifted-and-talented programs.  
 While some prior research has explored the overall diversity of gifted-and-talented 
programs, little work has been done to explore how bureaucratic admissions rules shape the 
diversity of gifted programs. My work builds on the few relevant recent studies analyzing the 
specific policies built into New York City’s elementary choice plans (Sattin-Bajaj & Roda, 2018) 
and examining who exercises public school choice, the types of schools they choose, and the 
school demographics and performance factors that drive their choices (Mader et al., 2018). My 





at each stage of the gifted-and-talented admissions process to better understand the complex 
relationships among student-level and neighborhood-level sociodemographic factors and how 
families navigate the system. My study also explores whether admission policies, such as test 
score cutoffs and sibling preferences, ameliorate or exacerbate the lack of diversity in gifted-and-
talented programs. Applying three constructs—bureaucratic decision rules, neo-institutionalism, 
and electoral interests and systemic power—to frame my research questions, I examine these 
relationships using a variety of descriptive and quantitative methods, including multi-level 
models and data visualization. 
 
Summary of Findings 
My findings reveal that that there are associations between student and community 
sociodemographic characteristics and how families navigate the bureaucratic system and engage 
at each stage of the gifted-and-talented admissions process. However, as families progress 
through each step in the process, I find fewer and fewer differences between sociodemographic 
groups. Although families who first engage with the gifted-and-talented admissions process by 
requesting to test do not reflect the diverse backgrounds of families enrolled in New York City 
schools, there are a more diverse group of families requesting testing and testing than there are 
further along in the process. In the latter stages of the process, families look more and more 
similar to one another, and the gifted-and-talented seats are filled mostly by advantaged, Asian, 
and White children and very few low-income, Black, and Hispanic children.  
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that families’ enrollment decisions vary for 
city and district programs and are likely shaped by various factors. Among children who 





White and Asian families are more likely to leave their zoned schools to enroll in a gifted-and-
talented program (Mader et al., 2018) and that Black and Hispanic families are less likely to 
leave their zoned schools (Henig, 1990; Roda, 2015). Families’ decisions of where to enroll their 
child might be shaped by the accessibility and proximity to gifted-and-talented programs, by the 
desirability of a family’s default zoned elementary school, by their ability to afford alternatives 
options outside the school system, and/or by their preferences for settings where they are racially 
or culturally represented rather than isolate. Despite these differences, overall, most families 
accept their offer and enroll in a gifted-and-talented program for kindergarten. A greater 
proportion of district eligible children who receive offers enroll in their zoned elementary 
schools compared to their city eligible peers who receive offers, reflecting how seats to city 
programs are more coveted than seats to district programs. 
With respect to how gifted-and-talented admissions rules, specifically test score criteria 
and sibling priority, influence the diversity of gifted-and-talented programs, three constructs—
bureaucratic decisions rules, neo-institutionalism, and electoral interest and systemic power—
help explain my results. Despite intentions to broaden the limited access to advanced historically 
marginalized students of color and low-income students perpetuated by varied and unclear 
enrollment policies, implementing a centralized, system-wide exam and test score cutoffs only 
led to more inequity in the gifted-and-talented program (Gootman & Gebeloff, 2008). While 
providing an efficient means to define eligibility, the bureaucratic rules of a 90th percentile 
requirement for district programs and the 97th percentile requirement for city programs 
undermine the program’s effectiveness in increasing the diversity of students and dramatically 
shift the racial/ethnic and socioeconomic composition of eligible candidates. Test score cutoffs 





talented programs overall and particularly to city programs. Therefore, while the original intent 
of implementing test score criteria may have been to expand access and increase diversity, the 
policy itself reflects systemic power rooted in bureaucratic organizations and policies as the 
score criteria appear to perpetuate the existing social inequities and continues to advantage the 
already advantaged. 
In contrast to test score criteria, admissions rules do not severely exacerbate the lack of 
diversity of offers. Although Asians and other race/ethnicity students are slightly more likely to 
receive an offer than their White peers and those residing in more educated areas are slightly less 
likely to receive an offer, otherwise my findings suggest no difference in the likelihood of 
receiving an offer by any of the other student- or zone-level sociodemographic attributes. 
However, offers to first-choice or top-three-choice programs do vary by admissions rules. 
Interestingly, once a child meets the test score criteria for city and district programs, the test 
score plays a far less important role in determining who receives an offer to a first-choice or top-
three-choice program. Instead, sibling preferences give families a strong advantage in receiving 
an offer to their first-choice city or district gifted-and-talented program. Although less extreme 
than the test score criteria, sibling preferences also reinforce the existing social inequities. Since 
more Asians, Whites, and higher income families are overrepresented in gifted programs, sibling 
priority continues to advantage these very families who already have a child in a gifted-and-
talented program and perpetuates a cycle of limiting the diversity of offers. Therefore, my results 
suggest that irrespective of intentions, the system—specifically the test score criteria and to a 
lesser extent the sibling priority—exacerbates the lack of diversity in gifted-and-talented 
education by continuing to serve the interests of the already advantaged children and families 







There are several important limitations when interpreting the results of this study. First, 
my sample does not include all four- and five-year-old children in the city, and thus, my findings 
are not directly generalizable to the population of four- and five-years-old across the city. In fact, 
my sample likely excludes many higher-income, White families who do not engage with any of 
the NYCDOE admissions processes and only apply for private school options. Therefore, my 
results might exaggerate or reduce differences between race/ethnicity and socioeconomic groups.  
Second, my analytic models would benefit from the inclusions of certain measures. For 
one, my models would be improved by more valid measures of students’ socioeconomic status. 
The FRL eligibility indicator is a crude measure for family income. The neighborhood college 
graduate and median income measures are more accurate measures and likely capture some 
student-level socioeconomic differences. Furthermore, my analyses do not include two important 
variables: distance to gifted-and-talented programs and families’ kindergarten offers. Distance is 
a key factor in families’ decisions about their child’s education. While some advantaged families 
might be able to afford chartering buses or vans so that their children could attend a gifted-and-
talented program outside of their neighborhood (Roda, 2018), other families might be less 
inclined to engage in the process if they know they cannot travel the distance to the program or 
afford alternative transportation. Including data on kindergarten offers would provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of how families make enrollment decisions. Families who live in 
elementary school zones of highly desirable schools would also be less inclined to enroll in 
gifted-and-talented programs, preferring to enroll their child in their neighborhood zoned school.     





Following up with future years of data and having a larger sample of multiple cohorts would 
allow researchers to explore the relationship between sibling preferences and gifted-and-talented 
admissions with greater confidence that their data is representative of the whole and not specific 
to the unique circumstances or climate of a single year. 
Lastly, while my quantitative analyses of a large sample allow me to derive important 
facts from the data, including preference trends and differences between groups, supplementing 
this work with a qualitative study would enrich my study. Interviews with families would have 
allow me to address questions about why families made certain decisions and what their 
experiences with the gifted-and-talented admissions process was like.  
 
Policy Implications and Future Research 
Despite these limitations, my findings suggest some implications for policy and future 
research. The most extreme policy change would be to phase out traditional gifted-and-talented 
programs and to replace them with schoolwide programs that offer all students access to more 
enriched instruction. Contemporary experts of gifted-and-talented education have advocated for 
phasing out traditional gifted-and-talented programs and shifting to a school wide enrichment 
model where more advanced students learn alongside their peers of all academic abilities, and 
each student learns through an individualized program of study (Roda, 2020a; School Diversity 
Advisory Group, 2019). Studies have shown that mixed-ability classrooms are beneficial to 
students with lower proficiency levels and do not harm the learning and development of their 
above proficiency level peers (Burris & Welner, 2005). However, as mentioned earlier, the 
backlash to the SDAG recommendations suggests challenges in moving forward with this 





response from some elected officials and potential mayoral candidates for expanding the gifted 
program (Veiga, 2019; Witt, 2019) aligns with the notion of systemic power and how elected 
officials are inclined to favor the interests of the advantaged because of the hierarchical system 
of stratification that motivates them to. 
Although my results suggest that sibling preferences only advantage a small number of 
applicants, eliminating sibling preferences will still free up seats and allow for a more merit-
based process. While modestly improving the diversity of programs, eliminating this priority 
would serve as a signal to families that no preferential treatment will be given in the admission 
process. Although eliminating sibling preferences will face pushback from families with children 
in gifted-and-talented programs who expect their younger children to enjoy the advantage of 
sibling priority as well as families who want their children to attend the same school because of 
transportation and convenience factors regardless of whether the older sibling is in a gifted 
program, there are many more families who are not reaping the benefits of sibling priority that 
will likely support decisions to eliminate this admissions preference.  
From the onset the families that request testing and test are not representative of the 
student population at large. Based on the research on family background that finds differences in 
access to information (Belfield & Levin, 2009; Lareau, 2003; Levin, 2002, 2009; Sattin-Bajaj & 
Roda, 2018), trust of teachers and schools and (Adams & Christenson, 2000; Bryk & Schneider, 
2002; Dunlap & Fox, 2007), and parental educational involvement (Alameda-Lawson, 2014; 
Anderson & Minke, 2007; Dearing et al., 2006; Fishel & Ramirez, 2005; Guli, 2005; Hoover-
Dempsey et al., 2005), there needs to be better outreach to families, particularly targeting 
marginalized groups that are underrepresented in gifted-and-talented programs. Although not the 





help increase the diversity of families engaging in the gifted-and-talented admissions process. 
The admissions processes in New York City are both complicated and difficult for parents to 
navigate. For students turning five, at the baseline families are expected to complete an 
application for kindergarten. However, families also have the option to complete an application 
for gifted-and-talented programs and separate applications for different charter schools. Without 
adequate outreach informing parents of all the available options, many are likely unknowingly 
left out of the process from the start. Furthermore, each process is different and has its own 
deadlines and rules, which can be overwhelming for parents to navigate. A study of the seventh 
through twelfth graders at exam schools in Boston found that interventions such as information 
campaigns or changing test times and locations to be more convenient to students would only 
slightly increase the participation rates of historically marginalized students of color (Goodman 
& Rucinski, 2018). Therefore, while a more streamlined admissions process might recruit a more 
diverse group of children to request testing and test for gifted-and-talented programs, it might not 
dramatically change the proportion of low-income, Black, and Hispanic students enrolled in 
gifted programs.  
Additionally, relying more on teacher referrals might encourage diversity of gifted-and-
talented candidates. As neo-institutional theories suggest, currently teachers can function as 
street-level bureaucrats and informally encourage or discourage certain children to participate in 
gifted-and-talented programming. However, if teacher referrals were formally a part of the 
admissions process, they would have greater influence in referring candidates. Although the 
effectiveness of teachers in accurately identifying gifted-and-talented students has been widely 
debated (Gagné, 1994; Gear, 1976; McBee, 2006; Pierce et al., 2007; Siegle & Powell, 2004; 





1986; Rohrer, 1995; Siegle et al., 2010) have indicated that teachers are not poor identifiers of 
gifted-and-talented students as early research indicated (Pegnato & Birch, 1959). While teachers’ 
preconceived notions of giftedness could preclude children with certain personality traits from 
consideration for gifted-and-talented programs, overall, “teachers [are] able to recognize 
intellectual potential in students who were not the stereotypical White, fit, well-adjusted, high-
achieving students” (Rohrer, 1995, p. 279). Wright and Ready (2011) remark, for example, that 
when controlling for between-group assessment score differences, “teacher perceptions of Black 
children’s cognitive skills are generally unbiased” (p. 337). However, a recent study by Grissom 
and Redding (2016) found that Black students who have Black teachers are significantly more 
likely to be assigned to gifted-and-talented programs than Black students with non-Black 
teachers. The general lack of diversity in the teacher workforce presents challenges to increasing 
the identification of gifted Black students. Therefore, before relying more heavily on teacher 
referrals, the evidence of potential teacher biases of students’ disability status (Bianco & Leech, 
2010), gender (Bianco et al., 2011; Powell & Siegle, 2000), and race/ethnicity and culture 
(Alviderez & Weinstein, 1999; Ford,1998; Ford & Grantham, 2003; Ford et al., 2002; Grissom 
& Redding, 2016; McBee, 2006) all warrant the need for further research on the reliability of the 
teacher referral process, developing in-service training for teachers and staff, and consideration 
of how to promote greater teacher diversity to help ameliorate racial gaps in the identification of 
gifted students.  
Implementing universal screening for New York City’s kindergarten gifted-and-talented 
programs would eliminate the issues presented by a referral process and the differential 
engagement in the admissions process. Although research simulating mandatory testing for exam 





marginalized students of color (Goodman & Rucinski, 2018), evidence from both kindergarten 
(Card & Giuliano, 2016) and higher education (Hyman, 2017) suggest a voluntary entrance 
exams system leaves many talented historically marginalized students of color undetected. While 
the population of kindergartners enrolled in a NYCDOE school is nearly 25 percent Black and 
over 40 percent Hispanic, less than 40 percent of students who actually take the gifted-and-
talented test are Black or Hispanic. Although universal screening is costly, the IBO’s evaluation 
of costs suggests that the costs to test all kindergarteners, first and second graders would not be 
exorbitant (Chapman, 2019). Implementing universal screening of all entering kindergartners 
would ensure that every child has an opportunity to be screened for eligibility for gifted-and-
talented services.  
However, while universal screening might encourage a more diverse pool of candidates 
at the onset of the admissions process, the test score cutoffs pose another issue for the diversity 
of gifted-and-talented programs. As former studies (Lee & Burkam, 2002; Ready, 2010) and my 
findings reveal, there are early child cognitive inequalities that can dramatically limit the 
diversity of children eligible for gifted services. One potential way to ameliorate this problem is 
to lower the test score criteria. As demonstrated by the differences between the city-eligible and 
district-eligible students, the lower test score criterion for district programs allows for a 
somewhat more diverse pool of candidates than the higher score criterion for city program. 
Although further research would need to be conducted to determine new cut scores, lowering the 
score for both city and district programs would allow for a more diverse group of eligible 
candidates. Furthermore, once students meet the test score cutoff, if offers were made on a 
lottery basis rather than by descending test score, this would also encourage greater diversity. 





normed, standardized tests would allow for a broader and more comprehensive interpretation of 
giftedness and alternative screening processes. Other approaches to screening for giftedness 
include using multiple criteria for selection, the inclusion of measures of creativity (Renzulli, 
1978), and the inclusion of portfolios (Wright & Borland, 1993). For example, the Los Angeles 
Unified School District defines giftedness using various measures including intellectual ability, 
high achievement ability, specific academic ability, creative ability, leadership ability, visual arts 
ability, and performing arts ability. It is important to note, however, that rethinking how to define 
giftedness and then implementing alternative approaches to screening is not a simple task but 
will require greater capacity and resources for evaluation. 
Implementing admissions preferences for underrepresented students would help increase 
the diversity of gifted-and-talented programs. In an effort to increase diversity in gifted-and-
talented programs, the NYCDOE implemented diversity in admissions interventions for the 
various admissions processes, including gifted-and-talented programs. Certain schools across the 
city are now participating by giving admissions priorities to ELLs, FRL eligible students, 
students in temporary housing, and/or other groups. The first diversity intervention for gifted-
and-talented programs was implemented in fall 2018 at Brooklyn School of Inquiry, which 
prioritizes applicants eligible for free or reduced-price lunch for 20 percent of kindergarten seats 
and to applicants who live in Districts 18 or 19 for 20 percent of kindergarten seats. However, 
with sibling priority in admissions, only a small number of seats were available to the wider 
public, and actual enrollment did not meet the number of seats reserved for low-income students 
and residents of District 18 or 19 (Veiga, 2017). As of fall 2019 school year, another six gifted-
and-talented programs participated in the diversity initiative.8 As more programs adopt diversity 
 
8 P.S. 015 Roberto Clemente (01M015) prioritized 65% of seats for applicants who were FRL eligible, lived in 





initiatives, it is important to continue to monitor and study the impact and effectiveness of these 
initiatives. Have gifted-and-talented programs with diversity initiatives achieved filling the 
reserved seats with children of the prioritized group? Have the diversity initiatives allowed for 
more low-income, Black, and Hispanic students to enroll in these gifted programs? Has the 
existence of diversity initiatives prompted a more diverse group of families to engage with the 
gifted-and-talented admission process overall? This research is necessary if we are to better 
understand both the successes and limitations of formal bureaucratic rules in promoting the 
diversity of gifted-and-talented programs and providing access to marginalized students who are 
typically excluded from gifted services.  
While the current gifted-and-talented programs participating in diversity in admissions 
initiatives primarily focus on increasing access for ELLs, FRL eligible students, and students in 
temporary housing, it is also important to design policies that give preference to other students in 
need of better quality educational opportunities. My findings revealed that families make 
decisions to accept or decline their gifted-and-talented offer based on their default options. 
Therefore, policymakers and researchers might consider whether admissions rules could include 
a preference for families specifically residing in low-performing elementary school zones, who 
likely do not have the financial resources or means to seek alternatives to their default zoned 
schools. For example, in 1999, Florida established the Opportunity Scholarship Program, a 
program that allows students attending persistently failing public schools to use scholarships to 
attend a participating private school or at a higher-performing public school within or adjacent to 
 
who were FRL eligible, lived in temporary housing, or were ELLs. P.S. 011 William T. Harris (02M011) prioritized 
30% of seats for applicants who were FRL eligible or who lived in temporary housing and/or live in Public Housing. 
P.S. 77 Lower Lab School (02M077) prioritized 12% of seats for applicants who were FRL eligible. The Anderson 
School (03M334) prioritized 30% of seats for applicants who lived in northern Manhattan and the south Bronx. Tag 





the student's district of residence. Although the program was declared unconstitutional in 2006 
and students assigned to a failing school are no longer allowed to transfer and enroll in a 
participating private school, they still maintain the option to attend a higher performing public 
school. A diversity in admissions initiative for gifted-and-talented programs based on the 
performance of students’ default school would give students without better alternative options an 
opportunity to benefit from gifted-and-talented services. To note, in New York City, diversity in 
admissions proposals are led by CSD superintendents and must be voted on and approved by the 
Community of Education Council, composed of mostly of elected parents of current students. 
Therefore, while efforts might be made by the NYCDOE to encourage superintendents to design 
diversity initiatives, passing these proposals requires greater buy in from the community. 
Furthermore, while diversity in admissions plans are currently voluntarily implemented by 
schools, a broader policy requiring all gifted-and-talented programs to include some element of a 
diversity in admissions policy would foster greater diversity across all programs. 
My work also suggests other areas for future research. While I analyzed the relationships 
between the diversity of gifted-and-talented services and formal bureaucratic rules, such as test 
score cutoffs and sibling preferences, examining other admissions rules would also be useful. For 
example, it would be helpful to understand how district preferences shape the diversity of district 
gifted-and-talented programs. How does residing in a district with more gifted-and-talented 
programs change the sociodemographic composition of families engaging in the admissions 
process? Since programs are concentrated in districts with more advantaged families and a few 
districts composed of more low-income, Black, and Hispanic residents do not have any gifted 






Although this study analyzed each stage of the gifted-and-talented admission process, it 
did not address what happens after students enroll in gifted programs. Another avenue for future 
research is to explore the retention rates of students in gifted-and-talented programs. While my 
study focused on the diversity of gifted-and-talented recruitment, it is equally important to 
understand whether families who enroll in gifted-and-talented programs remain enrolled 
throughout the kindergarten year and in following grade levels. What are the retention rates of 
low-income, Black, and Hispanic students in comparison to their more advantaged, White peers? 
Are retention rates different for city and district programs? Do retention rates vary by the 
sociodemographic composition of the program, of the school the program is located in, or of the 
neighborhood the program is located in? Understanding how retention rates vary will allow 
policymakers and educators to better address the challenges that children and their families face 
to remain enrolled in gifted-and-talented programs.  
Applying the concepts of bureaucratic decision rules, neo-institutionalism, and electoral 
interests and systemic power as a lens to analyze formal admissions policies and their 
associations to the lack of diversity in the gifted-and-talented programs, this dissertation 
demonstrates how family choices and administrative rules shape the diversity of gifted education 
and the challenges that bureaucratic rules pose to encouraging diversity. Continuing these 
various avenues of research may generate insights into how to design and implement policies 
that allow not only low-income, Black, and Hispanic children to gain greater access to gifted 
programs, but also advantaged, Asian, and White families to benefit from more enriching, 
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Table 3.3. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Student-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Missing student-level data 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25***
Female 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
Race/ethnicity
Asian 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08***
Black -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.04***
Hispanic -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.05***
Other 0.01~ 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.03***
English Language Learners -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11***
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.04*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.02***
Students with Disabilities -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09***
Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity
% Asian (10s of %s) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
% Black (10s of %s) 0.01* 0.00 0.01** 0.00
% Hispanic (10s of %s) -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01***
% Other (10s of %s) -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
% United States citizen (10s of %s) 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01***
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05***
Median income ($10,000s)1 -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02***
Socioeconomic Interactions
FRL by % Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) -0.01*** -0.01***
FRL by Median income ($10,000s) 0.02*** 0.02***
Constant 0.33*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 0.33*** 0.19*** 0.11***
~p <0.1; *p <0.05; **p <0.01; p <0.001***; 1Centered






Table 3.4. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Student-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Female 0.00 0.00 0.00
Race/ethnicity
Asian 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
Black -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.06***
Hispanic -0.10*** -0.07*** -0.07***
Other -0.01~ 0.00 0.00
English Language Learners -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02***
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.03*
Students with Disabilities -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity
% Asian (10s of %s) 0.00 0.00
% Black (10s of %s) 0.00 0.00
% Hispanic (10s of %s) -0.01*** -0.01***
% Other (10s of %s) -0.01* -0.02*
% United States citizen (10s of %s) 0.00 0.00
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) 0.02*** 0.02***
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) 0.01*** 0.01***
Median income ($10,000s)1 0.01*** 0.00
Socioeconomic Interactions
FRL by % Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) 0.00
FRL by Median income ($10,000s) 0.01***
Constant 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.88***







Table 3.5. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 
Socioeconomic Interactions, and Applying (Using Ordinary Least Squares Regressions). 
 
  








English Language Learners 0.04** 0.03**
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible 0.00 0.00
Students with Disabilities -0.02 -0.02
Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity
% Asian (10s of %s) 0.01*
% Black (10s of %s) 0.00
% Hispanic (10s of %s) -0.01**
% Other (10s of %s) -0.04***
% United States citizen (10s of %s) -0.02**
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) -0.01**
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) 0.00
Median income ($10,000s)1 0.00
Constant 0.09*** 1.08***







Table 3.6. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 





Model 1 Model 2
Student-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics







English Language Learners 0.02 0.01
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible 0.04*** 0.02*
Students with Disabilities -0.01 -0.02
Top choice offer 0.19*** 0.17***
Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity
% Asian (10s of %s) 0.01
% Black (10s of %s) -0.02***
% Hispanic (10s of %s) -0.03***
% Other (10s of %s) -0.05**
% United States citizen (10s of %s) -0.05***
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) -0.05***
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) -0.03***
Median income ($10,000s)1 0.00
Constant 0.54*** 1.27***







Table 3.7. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 





Model 1 Model 2
Student-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics







English Language Learners 0.04*** 0.02
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch eligible 0.04*** 0.02*
Students with Disabilities 0.03* 0.02
Top choice offer -0.03*** -0.05***
Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Race/ethnicity
% Asian (10s of %s) 0.00
% Black (10s of %s) -0.01**
% Hispanic (10s of %s) -0.02***
% Other (10s of %s) 0.02
% United States citizen (10s of %s) 0.01~
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) 0.00
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) -0.04***
Median income ($10,000s)1 0.01***
Constant 0.92*** 1.06***







Table 3.8. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Student-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics
Female 0.43* 0.48* 0.48*
Race/ethnicity
Asian -0.61* 0.36 0.43
Black -13.99*** -9.24*** -9.01***
Hispanic -9.90*** -6.16*** -5.97***
Other -0.63 0.03 0.05
ELL -5.49*** -5.82*** -5.81***
FRL -9.89*** -7.84*** -1.50~
SWD -5.61*** -5.81*** -5.72***
Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characterisitics
Race/ethnicity
% Asian (10s of %s) -0.09 -0.08
% Black (10s of %s) 0.19* 0.13
% Hispanic (10s of %s) -0.46*** -0.52***
% Other (10s of %s) -1.87*** -2.15***
% United States citizen (10s of %s) -0.11 0.04
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) 1.92*** 1.96***
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) 2.35*** 2.90***
Median income ($10,000s)1 0.08 -0.27**
Socioeconomic Interactions
FRL by % Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) -0.17***
FRL by Median income ($10,000s) 0.87***
Constant 81.22*** 68.76*** 65.35***







Table 3.9. The Associations Between Student-Level and Zone-Level Sociodemographic Characteristics, 
Socioeconomic Interactions, and Receiving an Offer (Using Ordinary Least Squares Regressions). 
 













% Asian (10s of %s) 0.00
% Black (10s of %s) 0.00
% Hispanic (10s of %s) 0.00
% Other (10s of %s) 0.03~
% United States citizen (10s of %s) 0.00
% Limited English-speaking household (10s of %s) -0.02**
% Bachelor's degree or higher (10s of %s) -0.05***
Median income ($10,000s)1 0.00
Constant 0.72*** 1.02***
~p <0.1; *p <0.05; **p <0.01; p <0.001***; 1Centered
With Student-Level Data
(n=12,496)
